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The "Priceless Possession" of Citizenship: Race,
Nation and Naturalization in American Law, 18801930
J. Allen Douglas'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1921, as restrictive immigration policy in the United States
quickened, the federal district court in Washington State considered the plea of N. Nakatsuka to lease land for agricultural development in the face of the state's newly implemented "Anti-Alien
Land Law."' Writing for the court, Judge Cushman noted that, as
an alien resident, Nakatsuka could neither lease nor own land in
the state, as that was a privilege limited to American citizens.'

1. Law Clerk to the Hon. Robert B. Krupansky, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit,
JD Cornell Law School, M.A., Ph.D. American History, Rutgers University. For their contributions, ideas and advice on this article I thank Jim Livingston, Stan Katz, Jackson
Lears, Joan Scott, David Lyons, and Caroline Goeser. For their support I also thank the
Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation and the Center for the Critical Analysis
of Contemporary Culture at Rutgers University. I also benefitted from participant comments at the conferences of the American Society of Legal History, and the American Studies Association. For their assistance during my formative thinking on this project I also
thank Greg Alexander, Dru Cornell, Dirk Hartog and Steve Shiffiin.
2.

Terrace v. Thompson, 274 F. 841, 848 (WD Wash. 1921), affirmed Terrace v.

Thompson, 44 S.Ct. 15, 20, 263 U.S. 197, 220, 68 L.Ed. 255, 255 (1923) on motion from
Nakatsuka and intervening seller to declare invalid the "Anti-Alien Land Law" of the state
of Washington (Law of 1921, ch. 50), which prevented claimant as an alien from purchasing
property for farming on the grounds that it conflicted with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and with the treaty between the United
States and Japan.
3. Id. at 841. The privilege was limited to citizens or to aliens who could, and have,
declared their intention to obtain citizenship. The constitution of the state of Washington
prohibited
[tihe ownership of lands by aliens, other than those who in good faith have declared
their intention to become citizens of the United States . . . except where acquired by
inheritance, under mortgage or in good faith in the ordinary course of justice in the
collection of debts; and all conveyances of lands hereafter made to any alien directly,
or in trust for such alien, shall be void: Provided, that the provisions of this section
shall not apply to lands containing valuable deposits of minerals, metals, iron, coal,
or fire clay, and the necessary land for mills and machinery to be used in the development thereof and the manufacture of the products therefrom. Every corporation,
the majority of the capital stock of which is owned by aliens, shall be considered an
alien for the purposes of this prohibition.
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Yet, as a "subject of the Emperor of Japan" who, Cushman presumed, bore the "prevailing ethnological characteristics of his fellow subjects," Nakatsuka was considered ineligible for citizenship
where naturalization was limited to "free white persons."' Thus,
not only was Nakatsuka's ability to acquire real property circumscribed, but he could not avail himself of what the judiciary had
come to regard as the "priceless possession" of American citizenship.6
WASH. CONST art. II, § 33 (1921).

See also Takuji Yamashita v. Hinkle, 260 U.S. 199
(1922), a companion case to Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). In Hinkle,
the Secretary of the State of Washington refused to allow the petitioners to incorporate the
Japanese Real Estate Holding Company because, as "persons of the Japanese race," they
were not entitled to naturalization. Yamashita v. Hinkle, 260 U.S. at 210. The state law
allowed only U.S. citizens to form corporations.
4. In his brief before the court, Nakatsuka declared only that he was a subject of the
Emperor of Japan, remaining silent on the issue of his racial identity. Such a declaration
was insufficient to prohibit Nakatsuka's citizenship, as the court noted that "Caucasians"
might also be subject to the Emperor, thus forcing the court to presume the petitioner's
.ethnological characteristics." Id. at 843.
5. Id. at 843. The court relied on the Congressional codification of naturalization
restrictions in § 2169, Revised Statutes Title XXX. (U.S. Comp. Stat. § 4358), limiting the
right of naturalization to those aliens being "free white persons, and to aliens of African
nativity and to persons of African descent." See also In re Young, 198 F. 715 (D. Wash.
1912); In re Saito, 62 F. 126 (D. Mass. 1894); In re Geronimo Para, 269 F. 643 (S.D. N.Y.
1919).
6. Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Foster cancelled the citizenship of petitioner
Norman Kramer, formerly a subject of the German emperor, predicated on testimonial
evidence that Kramer's loyalties lay with Germany. Foster concluded,
American citizenship is a priceless possession, and one who seeks it by naturalization
must do so in entire good faith, without any mental reservation whatever, and with
the complete intention of yielding his absolute loyalty and allegiance to the country of
his adoption. If he does not, he is guilty of fraud in obtaining his certificate of citizenship.
United States v. Kramer, 252 F. 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1919).
In the case of Kawabata v. Kawabata, 189 N.W. 237, 239-40 (N.D. 1922), affirming the
annulment of the plaintiffs marriage after finding that her consent was obtained by fraud
when the defendant assured her that he was a United States citizen even though he "was
not a citizen of the United States, and... could not become a citizen of the United States,"
Justice Grace of the North Dakota Supreme Court, noted that the fraud committed could
be found in the fact that Mabel Kawabata, had been deprived of the property of her citizenship when she consented to marry the man who fraudulently represented himself as a
citizen. Congress had directed that:
[A]ny American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her
husband. At the termination of the marital relation she may resume her American
citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an American citizen within one year with a
consul of the United States .... or, if residing in the United States at the termination
of marital relation, by continuing to reside therein.
Law of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, §3.
Of the centrality of citizenship to the American sense of self, Judge Grace observed:
To be a citizen of the United States, either by birth or naturalization, is a priceless
privilege. It possesses a moral value to the possessor, which is largely indeterminable. The average citizen of the United States, whether native-born or naturalized,
considers it one of his highest privileges. It gives him the feeling that his country
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places no impediment in the way of his advancement, though he may have been born
a child of poverty. He thinks of his right of equality before the law; his freedom of action under just legal restraint; his opportunity to freely write and speak the thoughts
of his mind, being responsible only for an abuse of those privileges. He thinks of the
fact that there is largely no limitation upon the official position or other place of
prominence or of trust that he may acquire, except such as are prescribed by his own
limitations of intellectuality or other personal qualities. He would give up all else
rather than lose such a privilege. We have known of those whose career was one of
long and continued criminality, and who had committed the deepest and blackest of
crimes, denoting great moral turpitude. We have seen them in the penitentiary while
paying the penalty of their transgressions, required of them by the majesty of the
law. We have listened to their plea for clemency on their application for pardon,
where they would claim they had expiated their offense by sufficient suffering occasioned by restraint of their freedom; but we have ever noticed that a plea of mercy
uniformly was accompanied with one for restoration of citizenship.
It would seem that, if such unfortunates feel that they cannot, after their liberation,
face the world unless again in the possession of their citizenship; that if they regard
themselves without it as unable to survive in the waves of scorn which they encounter as they again take up the voyage on life's ocean, if they consider themselves without it as a pilotless bark on an angry sea -- can it be said that it is not fraud to take
such a privilege from one who, so far as the record shows, is a reasonably good citizen? We think not.
Id. at 239-40.
Prior to Kawabata, the United States Supreme Court reviewed, and found reasonable, the
legislation requiring an American woman to take the nationality of her husband. In
MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, (1915), Justice McKenna, writing for the court, dismissed
the petitioner's writ of mandamus to have her California voting privileges reinstated after
her marriage to a British subject, observing:
We concur with counsel that citizenship is of tangible worth, and we sympathize with
plaintiff in her desire to retain it and in her earnest assertion of it. But there is involved more than personal considerations. As we have seen, the legislation was urged
by conditions of national moment. And this is an answer to the apprehension of counsel that our construction of the legislation will make every act, though lawful, as
marriage, of course, is a renunciation of citizenship. The marriage of an American
woman with a foreigner has consequences of like kind, may involve national complications of like kind, as her physical expatriation may involve. Therefore, as long as
the relation lasts, it is made tantamount to expatriation.
Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
Much later than the period under scrutiny here, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion
by Chief Justice Warren, would equate the loss of citizenship with "a form of punishment
more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that
was centuries in development." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (reversing Trop's involuntary expatriation that resulted from his conviction for wartime desertion while Trop
served in the U.S. Army in French Morocco in 1944. Trop was also sentenced to three years
of hard labor and given a dishonorable discharge.) See also LAUREN BERLANT, THE
ANATOMY OF NATIONAL FANTASY: HAWTHORNE, UTOPIA, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 13 (wherein Berlant finds "the modern state's assurance of national citizenship more fundamental to the person than any of his other historical
affiliations," noting the loss of citizenship (denaturalization) "violates the citizen through a
virtual ontological torture.").
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In its decision, the district court looked to the language of the
first naturalization act of the new Republic, approved March 26,
1790, and considered itself duty-bound,7
to hold impregnable the barrier erected by Congress to preserve, in its purity, our own type of civilization. The more
homogeneous its parts, the more perfect the union. It may be
that the changes wrought in the Orient in the last 50 or 75
years now warrant a different policy; but there is no law or
treaty that yet has said "the twain shall meet," or that if citizenship be accorded these Orientals, the danger is past of our
becoming a "mechanical medley of race fragments."
7. Whether an immigrant gained eligibility for United States citizenship depended
upon the judicial interpretation of the following clause under the act of Congress, which
limited the classes entitled to the benefit of naturalization by race:
The provisions of this title shall apply to aliens being free white persons, and to
aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.
The Congress of 1790 used the phrase "free white persons" to limit naturalization, while
the clause "aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent" was incorporated in
the amendatory statute approved July 14, 1870. Article I, § 8, of the Constitution provides
that Congress shall have the power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization." Consequently, courts have understood the matter of naturalization (as opposed to citizenship
prior to 1865) as exclusively within the control of the federal government. See In re Gee
Hop, 71 F. 274 (N.D. Ca. 1885).
8. Terrace v. Thompson, 274 F.841at 849. In addressing the constitutionality of its
position, the court concluded that
[tihere is no restriction upon the authority of Congress to discriminate in the matter
of the eligibility of an alien to become a citizen because of color. The Fifteenth
Amendment provides that the right of a citizen of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude. The Fourteenth Amendment made the negroes
citizens.
Id. In Terrace, however, the court reached beyond the plain language of the statute denying Nakatsuka citizenship because he was not a "white person," to contend that such language served only as a proxy for conduct and character, indeed, as a signal for an individual's disposition toward citizenship. The court observed:
It is obvious that the objection on the part of Congress is not due to color as color, but
only to color as an evidence of a type of civilization which it characterizes. The yellow
or brown racial color is the hallmark of Oriental despotisms, or was at the time the
original naturalization law was enacted. It was deemed that the subjects of these
despotisms, with their fixed and ingrained pride in the type of their civilization,
which works for its welfare by subordinating the individual to the personal authority
of the sovereign, as the embodiment of the state, were not fitted and suited to make
for the success of a republican form of government. Hence they were denied citizenship. It is this disqualification put upon them by the federal government to which
the state objects, and not their color, although the federal government may have
made their race color the irrefutable evidence of disqualification for citizenship.
Id (citations omitted). That the court chose to rationalize the congressional limitation on
naturalization through the mimetic equivalency of race and civilization certainly comports
with the cultural milieu of the period in which specific races were regarded as incapable of
attaining or appreciating democratic governance. The court specifically reached beyond

Spring 2005

Priceless Possession

373

To avoid the "mechanical medley of race fragments" and ensure
racial homogeneity, courts utilized the language and logic of property in their discussions of personal identity and citizenship. As
this article suggests, the tropes of that judicial discourse relied
upon the coherent and cohesive norms of legal property rules
commonly evoked by the fixed, tangible, and bounded characteristics of land.
Following Reconstruction, courts sought to invoke the coherence
of a classical conception of property in the service of a racially homogenous national citizenship. By addressing claims of naturalization and national identity in proprietary terms, invoking the
legal language and rules of exclusion, possession, alienability, and
diminution of value, courts framed national citizenship as a proprietary privilege available only to assimilable "free white persons."9 Courts deployed the rhetoric of objectivity, so redolent of
the classical nineteenth century conception of property, to lend a
measure of resolve and credibility to legal determinations on matters of race, nation, and identity, and to resist bringing "the law
and its administration into disrepute. " "
The classical conceptions of property served to buttress the judicial rhetoric on national citizenship as courts deliberated on the
possession of white identity and the exclusion of non-white petitioners from naturalization. The rules and protocols of a midnineteenth century property regime enforced the judicial definitions of self and nation as coherent legal forms, with certain
boundaries, capable of possession, exclusion and alienability. As
such, property initially provided the objectivity necessary for the

this rationale and, ironically, found the individual claimant before it, in a suit challenging
the authority of Congress, unsuitable for citizenship because he putatively arrived from a
civilization that subordinates the individual to the personal authority of the sovereign. In
the name of republican individualism the court deployed the blunt logic of generalization,
viewing the individual claimant through the communal lens of an imagined "Oriental despotism."
9. See supra note 7.
10. In re Mudarri,175 F. 465, 467 (D. Mass. 1910). As we shall see later, Judge Lowell
decried the absence of an ethnological consensus regarding race classification, an objective
determination of race parameters upon which the courts could render naturalization determinations without jeopardizing the image and legitimacy of a seemingly impartial judicial process. Indeed, the waning of the gloss of impartiality, the ephemerality of an Archimedean vantage provides current for the emergence of a culture of self described by legal
realists during this period. Thus, we find, among certain jurists, a marked professional
concern, in a maelstrom of difference, for clear lines charting the route to the legal determination of identity.
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courts to discuss and retain the boundaries of racial identity and
the value of national character.1
Yet, as the judiciary came to rely on the language of propertyas-object to convey the certainty and coherence of personal and
national identity, the very ground of property rules had begun to
shift. 2 Indeed, as this article suggests, in the arena of naturaliza11. With regard to the constitutional treatment of property in cultural and political
context, see generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 23-29 (1956) (discussing property and economic development and tracing the divergent application of property rules between "passive" and "dynamic" rights holders); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEwORK AND ITS LEGACY
11-12, 100-06 (1990) (discussing the influence of Madisonian views of private property balancing between democratic values and the privileged status of property owners - as
foundational in shaping the structure of the American political system); Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273,
274 (1991) (proposing multiple property discourses); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof
Property, in PROPERTY 69, 81 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (tracing
the diffusion of property during this period); Margaret J. Radin, Justice and the Market
Domain, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE: NOMOS XXXI 165, 165, 168-75 (John W. Chapman & J.
Roland Pennock eds., 1989) (discussing the sale of body parts and market alienability in
relation to property law); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 958-59 (1982) (proposing a personality-based approach to an appreciation of property
rights drawing on Hegel); David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting
Depictionsof Property in the American PoliticalFounding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 46780 (1993) (proposing a synthesis of the rhetoric and reality of property that influenced
public opinion during the founding); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 277, 297 (1998) (noting the slippage between property as a concept and enforceable
property rights in the law).
12. As the cohesive certainty of property had begun to fragment by matching and exceeding the collected demands of an increasingly corporate and mass culture predicated on
wage labor, the preeminence of the moral personality predicated on independence through
ownership of land yielded to an understanding of the serial and social self. See WALTER
LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY: AN ATrEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE CURRENT UNREST 50-51
(1914) (examining the reorientation of the relationship between property and personality
under the press of corporate capitalism). See also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 7-8 (1940) (articulating a
distinction between the possession and ownership of property as suggested by the modern
corporate form). Much of Berle's and Means's observations concerning the dissolution of
property echoes economist Thorstein Veblen's trenchant critique in The Theory of Business
Enterprise. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 120-30 (1935)
(discussing the tensions between traditional concepts of individual rights and personality
and reconfigurations of those concepts under corporate enterprise). In response, the cultural practices of the law began to locate the source of individual independence not in
landed property but as instantiated in the body of the person. By relying on the rhetoric of
appearance, biology and ethnographic science, with its implied purity of racial identity,
courts relocated the object of property into the body in an effort to manifest racial certainty
and avoid the contingency of the new property regime. This gesture may be understood as
an internalization of the late nineteenth-century populist promise of the moral personality
written upon the fact of the body. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN:
PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 204-23 (1991) (arguing that the populism of this period, manifest in several agrarian arenas, held out the promise of a moral personality conditioned
upon earlier, cohesive forms of proprietorship, a promise born out of the republican reliance
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tion claims, the judicial enunciation of national citizenship predicated on the possession of white racial identity ultimately rested
upon the logic of a relational property paradigm. That paradigm,
expressed in the language of property-as-subject, was already
emerging, even as the judiciary first addressed questions of race
and naturalization. Yet, the judiciary entertained varying legal
justifications for establishing the boundaries of self and nation, of
race and citizenship - moving from a reliance upon appearance
and geography to enlisting ethnography and, finally, entrusting
the "common parlance" of public opinion. That trajectory of justification, that search for judicial ballast, both reflected the influential contemporary changes undergoing the conception of property
and compelled those changes by validating a discourse of comparative and relational property as applied to personal identity
and national character. By ultimately relying on reputation to
signify whiteness, the judiciary both reflected the new relational
regime of property and extended the reach of that regime, collaborating in a discourse that nurtured the multiple voices of legal
modernity by locating personal identity outside of the individual.
II. THE FRAGMENTATION OF PROPERTY
Instead of relying on the coherence of objective property rules to
convey legal value, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century,
an emerging logic of property insisted on characterizing ownership
as a situational medley, involving a shifting set of social relationships, responsive to legal rules but necessarily contingent. 3 In
this emerging view of property-as-constellation, legal value arose
not from an object of property per se, but from the legal interests
held by persons in relation to the legal interests of the 'owner' or
upon the freehold, the external object of desire, as the condition for the formation of the
moral personality necessary for independent and incorruptible civic participation). Where
the law recognized a certain form and capacity of the self embodied in the relationship to
the appropriation of property as a "thing" that contained a person's will, the fragmentation
of property, its serial quality and the separation of ownership and control, invited an expansion in the possibilities of personhood. See JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CAPITALISM 155-56 (1924).

13. During this period legal discourse revealed a new apprehension of property as necessarily fragmented and diffuse; property performed and gained meaning only through a
constellation of social relationships, of rights, duties, privileges, powers, and immunities.
Consequently, the abilities of property and personality, as conceptual frameworks for legal
discourse, to legitimate judicial decisions, provide a basis for claims, and act as a referent
for legal resolution yielded, instead, to a contested discourse concerning the meaning and
value of property and personality itself, a discourse that treated both concepts as open
questions in need of answers.
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person-in-possession of the 'object' of property. 4 In his late nineteenth century treatise on the law of eminent domain, John Lewis
articulated this contingent view of property when he admonished
his readers to "look beyond the thing itself, beyond the mere corporeal object, for the true idea of property .... The dullest individual among the people knows and understands that his property in

14. Property conceived of as a set ofjural relations used the object as merely the starting point of analysis, while the nineteenth-century culture of the yeoman and proprietary
freehold treated the object as the apotheosis of property. The tensions in this new regime
of property acceded to the subjectivity or constellation of legal concerns held by others. A
far-reaching debate among a group of legal writers during the first four decades of the
twentieth century amplified the meaning and significance ofjural relations on the practice
and theory of law, as both an analytical appreciation and realist observation. The proffered
calculus served to further challenge as inadequate the notion of property as a cohesive legal
form; property emerged from this discussion as a subjective psychological legal arrangement regarding some object of attention. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 24 (1913) [hereinafter
"Hohfeld I"] (observing that "[miuch of the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises
from the fact that many of our words were originally applicable only to physical things; so
that their use in connection with legal relations is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional"
in noting that the "true contrast" between the legal interests held by a fee simple owner of
land and an owner of a right of way across that land rests "in the fact that the fee simple
owner's aggregate of legal relations is far more extensive than the aggregate of the easement owner); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
JudicialReasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 746 (1917) [hereinafter "Hohfeld II"] (presenting an
influential set of jural opposites - right or no right, privilege or duty, power or disability,
immunity or liability - and jural correlates - right or duty, privilege or no right, power or
liability, immunity or disability - meant to clarify the existence of legal value within a
series of relationships); see also WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23-114 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923) [hereinafter "HOHFELD, LEGAL ESSAYS"]; Charles E. Clark,
Relations, Legal and Otherwise, 5 ILL. L.Q. 26, 27 (1922) (exploring the significance ofjural
relations); Arthur L. Corbin, What Is a Legal Relation?, 5 ILL. L.Q. 50 (1922) (urging the
application of jural relations not as a means of predicting the certainty of the law, but as a
condition for a discussion of legal value); Albert Kocourek, Plurality of Advantage and Disadvantage in Jural Relations, 19 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (1920) (discussing the application
and juristic significance of Hohfeld's conception of jural relations); Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV.L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1938). Radin noted that
the only legal fact ...is a relation between two such human beings. No relation that
has legal relevance exists between a human being and a thing, between a human being and a group of other human beings considered as a group, nor between a human
being and an abstract idea.
Id. For contemporary appreciation of these conceptual changes, see GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 310-23 (1997) (discussing the bundle of rights theory of
property); J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1119, 1123 (1990) (proposing an application of Saussure's and Peirce's notions of
semiotics to extend an understanding of Hohfeldian jural relations and the consequent
impact on the thought of legal realists and fellow travelers of the critical legal studies
movement); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregationof Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239, 283-301 (1994) (presenting a reevaluation of
the bundle of rights theory of property).
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anything is a bundle of rights." 5 One court conveyed the nature of
the change when it observed in 1902, that:
Property... is not, in its modern sense, confined to that which
may be touched by the hand, or seen by the eye. What is
called tangible property has come to be... but the embodiment, physically, of an underlying life - a life that, in its contribution to success, is immeasurably more effective than the
mere physical embodiment.16
American Pragmatist William James put the serial quality of
property in psychological terms when, in 1890, he observed that "a
man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind."17 The differences between an object-centered conception of property and the
notion of property as serial and social emerged in the tension between a judicial discourse of race identification predicated on the
ontological certainty of ethnology, the "science of race," and one
premised on designation through public opinion or "common understanding." Each judicial discourse understood racial selfhood
differently, as either prior to the polis and possessing a singular
moral personality, or as a condition of the community from which
identity emerged.18

15.

JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES

43 (1888).
16. National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1902).
17. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. I. at 294 ((Henry Holt & Co.
1890), at 294; James acknowledged the proximity of property and personality when he
remarked, immediately prior to this observation, "[Ilt is clear that between what a man
calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to draw." Id. at 291 (emphasis
in original). See also, RICHARD ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 132-99 (1914) (suggesting that a property right provides the
exclusive control over some thing); J.W. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning 'Legal
Cause' at Common Law, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 16, 30-36 (1909) (proposing a serially relational
conception of negligence based on the scope of duty, and suggesting it supplant the objectact notion of probable cause foundational to tort analysis). See also, Hohfeld II, supra note
14, at 710-47. Additionally, this rearrangement of the corpus of property, ascribing legal
weight and substance of an object of attention to jural relations held by parties, echoed the
analytical treatment of relations by James, who observed, "[Tihe relations that connect
experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced
must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system." William James, A World of
Pure Experience, 1 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 533, 534 (1904) (proposing an appreciation of radical empiricism predicated on experience).
18. The reconstruction of property as a set of jural relations implied that the moral
personality of the autonomous freeholder had been excluded from cultural and legal sovereignty, or that its rational coherence was at least open to debate. The fixed character of
that personality did little to explain or contain new demands on identity.
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Cultural commentators of the period adopted the language of
the new property conception when they condemned the global diversity of immigrants to the United States as threatening the stability and cohesiveness of the national body politic. Writing in
1906, and reflecting a common thread of anti-immigration sentiment predicated on racial superiority, Prescott Hall remarked that
"colonies of such immigrants are like hard-caked patches of clayey
soil, unfertilized by the stream of public life flowing around, and
unable to absorb the needed moisture even from contiguous
earth."19 In this vein, civic assimilation and consumption into the
national community, the ability, in the words of one writer, to "digest" new immigrants, proved the hallmark of a "melting-pot" ideology predicated on citizenship conceived as a national form of
property that drew its meaning from the social relationship of the
body politic. In this nativist view, immigration in general, and
non-assimilation of immigrants in particular, threatened to disrupt the constellation of the body politic, and consequently, adversely affect both the "heritage" of national character and the
property value of citizenship."0 Those contemporary observers who
acclaimed the connections between race, citizenship and nation
did so in the belief that the constellation of the public arena was
an organic expression of property, much as the advocates of the
real entity theory of corporate personality viewed the corporate
form as an organic expression of property.2 1 Indeed, these writers
19.

PRESCOTT HALL, IMMIGRATION AND ITS EFFECTS UPON THE UNITED STATES (1906).

Years earlier, the United States Supreme Court, in assessing the constitutionality of the
Chinese exclusion act of May 5, 1892, enunciated similar concerns over the lack of assimilation and its effect on the body politic and the property of citizenship. The court observed:
After some years' experience under that treaty [between the United States and China
on July 28, 18681, the government of the United States was brought to the opinion
that the presence within our territory of large numbers of Chinese laborers, of a distinct race and religion, remaining strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own country, unfamiliar with our institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people,
might endanger good order, and be injurious to the public interests.
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1023 (1893).
20. Nativists viewed continued non-white immigration as disruptive of the national
family. They purposefully adopted the familial rhetoric as a vehicle for establishing that
non-white immigrants did not belong to the already established American national family
because they lacked the proper biological lineage and cultural and religious heritage, and
could not, therefore, inherit the mantle of citizenship held in public trust without radically
disrupting the constellation of membership that defined that national family.
21. The concept of personality exhibited similar tension, during this period, in which
the original conception of the person as coherent and immutable acceded to an understanding of the individual as relationally different, depending upon the context. During this
period the courts extended the designation and protection of legal personality to the corporate form, a move that engendered a wide-ranging discussion of the place of human self-
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on immigration and citizenship rigorously applied naturalistic
metaphors to the notion of the body politic, with Lothrop Stoddard
cautioning in 1920 that "immigration is. .. from the racial standpoint, a form of procreation... [and, thus] the admission of aliens
be regarded just as solemnly as the begetting of
should, indeed,
22
children."
Invoking the language of family furthered the claim that American national identity was fixed through lineage and heredity; a
rhetoric of blood lines which demanded a specific relationship to
an already admitted member of the body politic.23 In this context,
hood in the law. This assignment placed the corporate "individual" within the same ontological universe as the natural individual. During this period the courts extended the designation and protection of legal personality to the corporate form, a move that engendered a
wide ranging discussion of the place of human selfhood in the law. See Santa Clara County
v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (affirming a corporation as a person within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE
AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (Columbia University Press 1909) at 20-32 (defending the invio-

lability of the notion of the cohesive person in jurisprudence and critiquing as unnecessary
contemporary theories of consciousness that advanced the plasticity of the self); O'ITO
GEIRKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE (F.W. William Maitland trans., Cambridge University Univ. Press 1900) (arguing, influentially, for the communal or group
notion of personality found in the modern, as well as medieval, corporate form); John
Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655 (1926)

(arguing for a conceptualization of the corporation as a set of relations rather than as a
natural entity on par with the individual self); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., CorporatePersonality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 2531 (1911) (discussing the corporation as an entity separate from its
constituent members and worthy of legal personality); Harold Laski, The Personality of
Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1915) (discussing the ontological cohesion of corporations as separate personalities and comparing this to the legal understanding of associations).
22. LOTHROP STODDARD, THE RISING TIDE OF COLOR AGAINST WHITE WORLDSUPREMACY (1920) 44.

23. As courts used whiteness as the means for determining whether a petitioner might
receive citizenship status, their justifications for attributing certainty to their determinations of racial identity moved from an object centered analysis rendered through biology
and the "science" of ethnology, to a subjective question of "common parlance." The legal
treatment of citizenship emerged as a question not only of individual identity, but as a
question of collective national identity. That question of a petitioner's family origin, and of
the familial rhetoric of national identity began to occupy a central position in American
culture. See CHARLES W. GOULD, AMERICA, A FAMILY MATTER (1922) 163 (a nativist screed
noting that the desire to identify family members as belonging was also an acknowledgment that those outside the family were also outside the race, and further observing that
foreigners deprived the national family of its "heritage"); ANN DOUGLAS, TERRIBLE
HONESTY: MONGREL MANHATTAN IN THE 1920S (New York, 1995). The language of heritage, in determining which petitioners for naturalization might partake of the status and
property of citizenship, was a real and rhetorical means of circumscribing the manner in
which citizenship was legally dispensed. Absent the property of whiteness a petitioner
could not belong to the American national family; in the consideration of citizenship,
whiteness was a means of demarcating who belonged and who did not. More importantly,
it was also the means for refraining the discourse of citizenship, from a status that could be
acquired - an aspiration - to an identity that was only inherited by being in the line of
succession with regard to the American national family. As Walter Benn Michaels has
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assimilation was the means by which the value and character of a
national identity were maintained, even though that identity was
predicated on a constellation of social relationships. Such assimilation was trumpeted as the ability to fit into the national character without altering its composition; the body politic and the property of citizenship remained coherent and uncorrupted, maintained in meaning and effect by the absorption of new arrivals into
an already given set of social relations. These writers adduced
that non-white immigration, and the threat of non-assimilation,
recast this national arrangement and represented a new constellation of social relations and, as such, redefined the value and characteristics of citizenship as property.
III. THE PROPERTY OF CITIZENSHIP AS A NATIONAL FORM
"Citizenshipconveys the idea of membership of a nation."

observed regarding the nativism of the early twentieth century United States, "Insofar as
the family becomes the site of national identity, nationality becomes an effect of racial
identity." OUR AMERICA: NATIVISM, MODERNISM AND PLURALISM (1995) 8.
24. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22 L.Ed. 627 (1875). Francis Minor, a
St. Louis attorney, sued on behalf of his wife Virginia, whom he argued had been admitted
to citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment, and was therefore entitled to all the rights,
privileges, and immunities thereof. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Morrison Waite
concluded that although women are included as citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment,
they are granted "membership of a nation and nothing more," and the power to grant the
franchise had been retained by the individual states. Waite's analysis created a distinct
legal category for women, vis A vis citizenship, one unlike the petitioners denied naturalization on account of race, in which the Reconstruction Amendments did not so much exclude
women from politics as effectively silence them within it. Happersett is part of a larger
legal formalization of citizenship, however, in which the courts expressly assigned political
identity to the body of the petitioner. This represented an historic reversal in which the
body, heretofore present but largely invisible in the landscape of American politics, now
provided a rearranged mythic grounding and localization binding citizenship status to
specific features of a petitioner's body. As such, the body became the sign of a person's
qualification to participate in the public order and the mark of political interest. See also
ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS (1997) 337-348 (extended discussion of Happersett). See also
Ex parte (Ng) Fung Sing, 6 F.2d 670 (W.D. Wash. 1925) (stating, "Citizenship is a political
status, and may be defined and the privilege limited by the Congress.").
Echoing the federal thrust of the Reconstruction amendments, post-bellum jurisprudence
settled on the primacy of national citizenship over State citizenship, as the trope for public
membership and political participation that further removed the local from considerations
of citizenship; a trajectory ultimately at odds with citizenship decisions for non-white naturalization claimants. As Justice Miller observed in Slaughterhouse,
The distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is
clearly recognized and established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United
States without being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to
convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a
citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the
United States to be a citizen of the Union.
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The eighteenth century republican emphasis on the continuity
of self, at least as embodied in the notion of virtue, sought to arrest any rupture between the ordinary and the public life, between
the man and the citizen.25 With its emphasis on coherence, republicanism also placed a premium on the local institutions and forms
of self-governance that fostered continuity and self-identity in the
public sphere.26 This ontology of citizenship relied upon the ethic
of self-governance to fuse the twin efforts of achieving national
independence and governing the individual self.27
However, the constitutional solution to the problems of the organic unity of citizen and locale posed by the Articles of Confederation was to provide a conception of national citizenship that
abstracted and disembodied the citizen from local culture, one who
would be "the object of national administration rather than an

Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872). Justice Bradley agreed in his dissent "that
citizenship of the United States is the primary citizenship in this country; and that state
citizenship is secondary and derivative, depending upon citizenship of the United States
and the citizen's place of residence. The States have not now, if they ever had, any power
to restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons." Slaughterhouse,83 U.S. at 112.
25. The independence of the republican individual from the vicissitudes of political
influence and, therefore, the well-spring of moral personality in the polis, hinged on an
object-centered conception of property prior to politics and provided the singular means for
uncontaminated participation in the political process. Property, external to the self and
fixed in time and space -separated from and prior to the vicissitudes of the communitygenerated the promise of the moral personality in political thought and practice. See II
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 318 -19 (noting that the "right of property,
founded on occupancy, is suggested to the human mind, by feeling and reason, prior to the
influence of positive institutions"). See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS
AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977)
(discussing the connection between desire and property); DREw R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE
REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 69-75 (1980) (discussing the
influence of the Scottish enlightenment on Jefferson and Madison and the effort to balance
political virtues of an agrarian society with the economic benefits of commercial manufacturing); J.G.A. POCOCK, Civil Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American Thought, in
POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 80, 91-96
(1971) (discussing the importance of the political thought of Harrington enunciating the
value to the moral capacity of the self of the proprietary freehold as an agent for ensuring
political and moral independence); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 412-544
(1975) (discussing the ideology of self-determination as a regulative expression of the moral
self that negotiated between the thought of Locke and Harrington); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 46-90 (1969) (recounting intellectual
events preceding the formation of the Constitution).
26. Michael Warner, "The Mass Public and the Mass Subject," THE PHANTOM PUBLIC
SPHERE, ed. Bruce Robbins (1993) 236-244. See also, MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF
THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
(1990).
27. Joyce Appleby, "Introduction: Jefferson and His Complex Legacy," JEFFERSONIAN
LEGACIES, ed. Peter S. Onuf (1993) 3.
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active subject in local self-government."28 Viewed from one angle,
the Constitution's technique of citizenship entailed an abstraction
of the self that separated the local from the public:
The Constitution's framers constructed the "person" as the
unit of political membership in the American nation; in so doing, they did not simply set up the public standard of white
male embodiment - technically, in the beginning, property
ownership was as much a factor in citizenship as any corporeal schema. Nonetheless, we can see a real attraction of abstract citizenship in the way the citizen contentionally acquires a new body by participation in the political public
sphere. The American subject is privileged to suppress the
fact of his historical situation in the abstract "person": but
then in return, the nation provides a kind of prophylaxis for
the person, as it promises to protect his privileges and his local body in return for loyalty to the state.
Contrary to the narrative of the generic citizen, the naturalization cases examined in this article suggest a post-bellum legal
discourse struggling to sustain the terms of an abstracted and disembodied citizenship as a meaningful form of public property.
Against the trope of an abstracted proprietary citizen, the question of naturalizing putatively non-white immigrants gave expression to a legal narrative that granted the acquisition of citizenship
based on locality, corporeality and perceived public opinion. The
status of citizenship, as a form of property, was tied to public perception of character and reputation - it was simultaneously local
and national in form and effect and, as such, maintained a tension
between the disembodied object of the abstract citizen and the
subjective body of the petitioner. Indeed, the process of naturalization, of acquiring the public persona of citizenship, required a
re-embodiment of the self, from the vantage point of both the petitioner and the government. The resident immigrant pursuing
citizenship status literally had to embody a "white person," which,
between the 1860s and the 1920s, entailed explanations of racial
affinity predicated on performance, appearance, geography, eth28. Sheldon S. Wolin, "E Pluribus Unum: The Representation of Difference and the
Reconstitution of Collectivity," in THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST: ESSAYS ON THE STATE AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1989) 134.
29. Lauren Berlant, "National Brands/National Body: Imitation of Life," COMPARATIVE
AMERICAN IDENTITIES: RACE SEX, AND NATIONALITY IN THE MODERN TEXT, ed. Hortense J.

Spillers (1991) 112-13.
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nography, and family history.0 Yet, by the 1920s, the courts located citizenship identity in a body of public opinion, reconstructed from the bench, which insisted that the "common understanding" of whiteness served as the litmus test of a petitioner's
31
race.
30. See infra notes 56, 74 & 106.
31. See infra notes 125-148. As a term of analysis, "whiteness" partakes in the notion
that the meanings ascribed to racial identity exceed the boundaries of the biological to
participate in an arrangement of power relations that privilege the white subject position.
The term whiteness draws its explanatory resonance from the complicated manner in
which white racial markings draw power through the double gesture of an invisible presence; the privilege accorded white racial identity relies on the fantasy of the unprivileged
normative position, in which only nonwhite racial identity appears as marked. So understood, the deployment of "whiteness" as a category of analysis works to locate the meanings
of racial identity in social, cultural, economic, legal, linguistic, and political performance
and power. Appropriately, the term "whiteness" itself participates in the modernist privileging of vision and appearance when it brings into focus the unmarked nature of white
racial identity, the product of a discourse most influential when not in the field of vision.
For more about the hegemony of a visual discourse in modernity, see MARTIN JAY,
DOWNCAST EYES: THE DENIGRATION OF VISION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT
1-20 (1993). For information regarding cultural, legal, social, and historical considerations
of whiteness, see generally MIA BAY, THE WHITE IMAGE IN THE BLACK MIND: AFRICANAMERICAN IDEAS ABOUT WHITE PEOPLE, 1830-1925 (2000) (decentering the notion of understanding whiteness); VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL
CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA (1986) (discussing the inflections of racial meaning
in the specific context of Louisiana's laws relating to blood percentages); GRACE ELIZABETH
HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH, 1890-1940
(1998) (tracing the cultural markers of whiteness in the nascent consumer economy of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME
WHITE (1995) (tracing the cultural and political reconstruction of Irish ethnic identity in
the nineteenth-century United States); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A
DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998) (examining
the meaning of whiteness in the multiracial context of European immigration); SAMIRA
KAWASH, DISLOCATING THE COLOR LINE: IDENTITY, HYBRIDITY, AND SINGULARITY IN
AFRICAN-AMERICAN NARRATIVE (1997) (proposing the narrativization of color as a marker
of racial identity); LITERATURE AND THE BODY: ESSAYS ON POPULATIONS AND PERSONS
(Elaine Scarry ed., 1988); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE (1996) (discussing the legal construction of race in the context of immigration law
from the latter half of the nineteenth-century to the present); ERIC LoTr, LOVE AND THEFT:
BLACEFACE MINSTRELSY AND THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1993) (tracing the significant
cultural and economic relationship between blackness and whiteness as exemplified in
nineteenth-century popular performance of minstrelsy); PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF
IDENTITY (Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., 1996) (discussing rhetorical strategies of racial cross
representation in nineteenth- and twentieth-century United States literature); DAVID R.
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING
CLASS (1991) (tracing race and the rhetoric of whiteness in shaping white working class
interest in conflict with class solidarity); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF
WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY (1994) (discussing
whiteness as a category of analysis in studies of the U.S. working class); ALEXANDER
SAXTON, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE REPUBLIC: CLASS POLITICS AND MASS CULTURE
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990) (tracing the practice and ideology of racial exclusion among the wage-earning working class as weakening working class opposition to corporate capitalism); ERIC J. SUNDQUIST, To WAKE THE NATIONS: RACE IN THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN LITERATURE (1993) (tracing efforts in American fiction to integrate racial differ-
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The Constitution of the United States empowers Congress "to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization."" In the exercise of
this power, during its second session in 1790, Congress made provision for the admission to citizenship of three principal classes of
persons: aliens, having resided for a certain time "within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States" and naturalized individually by proceedings in a court of record; children of
persons so naturalized "dwelling within the United States, and
being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of such naturalization;" and foreign-born children of American citizens, coming
within the definition prescribed by Congress.33

ences); Wai-chee Dimock, Rightful Subjectivity, 4 YALE J. CRITICISM 25 (1990) (tracing the
contingent quality of rights in Plessy); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1709 (1993) (discussing the legal attributes assigned to white racial identity); Eric Lott, White Like Me: Racial Cross-Dressingand
the Constructionof American Whiteness, in CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM 474
(Amy Kaplan & Donald E. Pease eds., 1993); Brook Thomas, Tragedies of Race, Training,
Birth, and Communities of Competent Pudd'nheads, 1 AM. LITERARY HIST. 754 (1989). On
the issue of culture and racial identity, see generally JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT
OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART 277 (1988)
(elaborating on the legal and ethnographic construction of Native American identity); NEIL
FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE: MEXICANS, BLACKS, AND POOR WHITES IN TEXAS COTTON
CULTURE (1997) (discussing whiteness in multiracial context); ROBERT J.C. YOUNG,
COLONIAL DESIRE: HYBRIDITY IN THEORY, CULTURE AND RACE 90-117, 142-58 (1995) (discussing theories of whiteness, race, and ethnography in the nineteenth-century colonial
policies of Britain and the United States).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. James Kettner points out that
[n]aturalization - in the modem sense of a grant of status with an accompanying
package of rights - was preceded by and for a time coexisted with, the practice of removing disabilities and bestowing privileges piecemeal. Medieval English law posited a continuum of ranks and rights, but did not create distinctly separate categories
of subject and alien.
JAMES KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608 - 1870, (1978) 4-5.
Kettner also argues that, for the new American nation, naturalization was about contract
and consent with the community rather than the English view which insisted that the
essential purpose of naturalization was to make the alien legally the "same as a native
Englishman," that the adopted member's rights "must be deemed natural, personal and
perpetual." Id. at 9. Kettner goes on to suggest that with the emergence of the new republic, Americans
built upon the notion inherent in the process of naturalization that the tie between
the individual and the community was contractual and volitional, not natural and
perpetual. This idea shaped their response to the claims of Parliament and the King,
legitimized their withdrawal from the British empire, controlled their reaction to the
loyalists, and underwrote their creation of independent governments.
Id. at 10. Kettner's meticulous inquiry into the evolving meaning of naturalization ends in
1870, but the contemporary legal evidence between 1870 and 1930 clearly indicate that
naturalization resonated as more than a contractual right, that it had fused with the identity of the nation and its members as an interest in property. See supra note 6.
33. As one court insisted in 1909:
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Section One of the Act of 1790, entitled "An Act to Establish an
Uniform Rule of Naturalization," provided "that any alien, being a
free white person... may be admitted to become a citizen." Over
the course of the next century Congress repealed the act several
times in order to amend or attach personal fitness requirements
such as: lawful entry; enumerated years of continuous residence;
intention to reside in the United States permanently; ability to
write his or her name; ability to speak English; good moral character;34 and attachment to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States.35 The amended acts continued to retain the origiNaturalization creates a political status which is entirely the result of legislation by
Congress, and, in the case of a person not born a citizen, naturalization can be obtained only in the way in which Congress has provided that it shall be granted, and
upon such a showing of facts as Congress has determined must be set forth.
In re Knight, 171 F. 299, 301 (E.D. New York 1909). See also, KETTNER, supra note 32 at
209-224. As Kettner points out, records of the Philadelphia Convention reflect a pointed
concern by, for instance, James Madison, with the confusion inherent in a crazy-quilt of
naturalization laws and procedures. This note was also struck by the committee of Detail
report of August 6, 1787, which empowered the national legislature "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States." That sentiment appeared intact
in the Art. I, sec. 8 provision authorizing Congress to establish uniform bankruptcy and
naturalization laws throughout the new nation. Kettner points out that the urge for uniformity in naturalization did not lay to rest the question of whether such uniformity was
meant to standardize admission into state citizenship or whether it meant membership in a
national community. Id. at 231.
34. See also, Winfield E. Ohlson, "Moral Character and the Naturalization Act," 13
BOSTON U. LAW R. 636 (1927). Discussing the manner in which the legal arena apprehends
the distinction between the portrayal of character and reputation, much as cultural historians have observed the differences between the language of character and personality:
Courts have drawn a sharp distinction...between character and reputation. These
two terms are not interchangeable or synonymous. They are definitely opposite in
meaning. Character is subjective; reputation is objective. Character is fact; while
reputation smacks of conjecture and speculation. Character includes both natural
and acquired traits; while reputation consists of opinions which others hold of an individual-that is, it is a concept. Consequently, it is not a complete view-it is what an
individual is supposed to be. Actually, courts do not determine whether or not a person is of good character. It is impossible to do so, in that character is an inward quality which is incapable of being recorded or seen. Rather, the courts determine, by a
person's acts, whether or not his conduct satisfies in their minds a given standard of
conduct established and sanctioned by law or custom. These acts on the part of a petitioner constitute the external measure of his worth as a potential citizen.
Ohlson, at 636-36. See WARREN SUSMAN, CULTURE AS HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1985) (discussing the cultural distinction
between character and personality as a division that emerged during the first decade of the
twentieth century). It should come as little surprise that as the law moved from an objective apprehension to a subjective conception of property rights, during this period, the cultural language of character that represented the self as objective and immutable gave way
to a discourse of personality in which identity was represented as subjective, malleable and
fragmented.
35. These early debates regarded residency requirements for eligibility for election to
political office, for naturalization, oaths of character and renouncement of noble title, and
betrayed partisan divisions between those favoring a cautious naturalization policy in the
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nal language limiting naturalization to white persons. That rule
governed until 1873, when Congress revised the language of the
title to apply, additionally, to "aliens of African nativity and to
persons of African descent." 6
Citizenship in the United States operated under the general
rule that persons born in the United States were citizens regardless of the status or race of their parents, jus soli.17 Native Americans were the rather large exception to this rule," as were married
face of external threats and internal security needs and those weighing in favor of a more
liberal policy. Kettner characterizes these debates against the backdrop of concern for the
influx of foreign immigrants arriving in reaction to the European crisis touched off by the
French Revolution, attracting "disenchanted Englishmen, aristocratic Frenchmen, German
Pietists fleeing forced military service, French planters escaping from West Indian uprisings.., and Irishmen in flight from British repression." KETTNER supra note 32 at 239-40.
As Kettner observes, the question of immigration and national identity also pitted Federalists, who favored naturalization requirements designed to discourage "democratic disorganizers ... the discontented, the ambitious and the avaricious," against the Jeffersonians who
strove to make citizenship difficult for merchants and aristocrats whose "antirepublican
principles" threatened to pervert the manners and ideals of the American community. Id at
240.
Regardless of the flavor of that debate, citizenship was nevertheless viewed as a coherent
position, an undifferentiated status without rank or order, depending not on some accident
of birth alone, but centrally on "belief, will, consent, and choice." Id at 247. However, with
the rise of immigration from Eastern Europe and the Asian Pacific, beginning in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, citizenship began to assume the character of an acquisition
rather than the consensual and contractual impulse so central to earlier discussions of
naturalization policy when immigration was spurred by political conditions more than
economic considerations. With the imposition of racial strictures, acquiring citizenship was
now a proprietary act, one that separated the holder of a title to citizenship from the nonwhite resident aliens unable to ever acquire that form of civic property. Yet, by the 1920s,
while citizenship retained its proprietary form, the property interest itself shifted from one
that might be acquired to one that must be inherited, as first the immigration Act of
1921and then the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, established and extended the technology of
national quotas premised on the already existing ancestral composition of the American
population.
36. Supra note 7.
37. By and large, the common law countries began from the premise of jus soli in determining nationality with regard to public law, but relied upon place of domicile when
entertaining questions of private law. See e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 578
(1856) (J. Curtis) (observing that "[u]ndoubtedly, as has already been said, it is a principle
of public law, recognized by the Constitution itself, that birth on the soil of a country both
creates the duties and confers the rights of citizenship"). Distinguished from the common
law countries reliance on place of birth to determine citizenship, was the rule of jus sanguinis followed by the other nations of Europe whereby nationality devolved through parentage regardless of place. As one commentator quipped, the distinction is "between place
and race" in determining nationality and citizenship. H. J. Randall, Nationality and Naturalization:A Study in the Relativity of Law, 40 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 18, 23 (1924).
38. Whole tribes of Native Americans had been collectively naturalized either by special statute or by treaties, exercised wholly apart from the personal fitness of the individuals who thus acquired citizenship. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (collective naturalization of particular tribes). See also United States v. Lucero, 1. N.M. 422 (1869) (Pueblo
Indians). The Supreme Court determined early on that as tribes, Native Americans were
not foreign nations but "domestic dependent nations" whose individual members were born
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women. 9 In addition, under the Fourteenth Amendment, those
aliens although born in the United States. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831); see
also D. 0. McGovney, American Citizenship, 11 COL. L. REv. 326-337 (1911). Nor were
Native Americans eligible for naturalization by application as they did not qualify as "white
persons," aliens of African nativity, or persons of African descent. See In re Camille, 6 F.
256 (D. Or. 1880); In re Burton, 1 Alaska 111 (1900).
By other legislation, beginning in 1887 with the Dawes Act, Congress made provision for
individual naturalization of United States born Native Americans. The Act provided for
breaking up tribal lands and allotting them to individuals, each allottee then becoming a
citizen. Further, any native-born Native American might naturalize him or her self by
voluntarily residing apart from any tribe and adopting the "habits of civilized life." Law of
Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119 § 6, as amended by Law of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 868, and by Law of May 8,
1906, ch. 2348. 24 Stat. 390, 31 Stat. 1447, 34 Stat. 182, 1916 U.S. Comp. Stat. § 3951.
However, adopting the "habits of civilized life" represented a peculiar form of naturalization without record and without certificate. Further attempts to encourage a policy of Native American assimilation occurred in 1907 with the Lacey Act (allowing individual Indians to have control of their share of their tribe's funds), in 1917 with the Sells "Declaration"
(measures designed to achieve the absorption of Indians into the "body politic of the Nation"), and in 1919 with the World War I Veterans Act (authorizing citizenship for every
veteran who "desires it").
This piecemeal legislative effort to absorb Indians as citizens came to an end with in 1924
with the Citizenship Act, which declared all Native Americans born within the territorial
limits of the United States to be citizens. Law of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, § 43 (1924). Curiously, the Citizenship Act that celebrated the wholesale naturalization of Native Americans
emerged from the same Congress that promulgated the Johnson-Reed Act which placed
severe racial restrictions on immigration and citizenship directed largely at Eastern European immigration. Yet, while seemingly at odds with the other, both of these legislative
moves were consonant with the effort to refashion citizenship as a form of property that
was inherited rather than one that was acquired. With the Citizenship Act of 1924, Native
Americans no longer needed to adopt the "habits of a civilized life," or "desire" naturalization, they could now simply inherit citizenship through family. In a cultural and legal
climate in which the property of race was no longer defined by objectively regarded indicia
such as ethnology, color, or geography but, rather, was defined by reference to the vagaries
of community opinion, the next step in containing the diffusion of the property of citizenship was to circumscribe its application. Immediately after the Supreme Court decisions in
Ozawa and Thind, which established "common understanding" as the standard for determining race in the acquisition of citizenship, Congress redrew the boundaries of naturalization. Now citizenship was no longer a property to acquire or a status to obtain, but claimants inherited it through the virtual lineage of already or formerly present racial forebears.
39. Just as women generally lost their property and identity under the legal regime of
femme covert, so also a married woman assumed the foreign citizenship of her husband.
Such a move was certainly consonant with maintaining the public coherence of the republican male subject. Consider, for instance, the plight of Ng Fung Sing whom the court denied
admission under the Immigration Act of 1924. Ex parte (Ng)Fung Sing, 6 F.2d 670 (W.D.
Wash. 1925). Sing was born in Port Ludlow, Washington, in 1898 of Chinese parents. At
the age of 18 she and her parents moved to China where, in February 1920, she married a
citizen of China who died on July 2, 1924. Sing sought to return to the United States in
1925 to resume her citizenship and was denied admission upon her arrival in Seattle. Sing
brought her claim pursuant to § 3 of the Act of March 2, 1907, which provided that
any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband. At the termination of the marital relation she may resume her American citizenship...by returning to reside in the United States.
Law of March 2, 1907, ch. 34 § 3. As an American citizen by birth, under the Act, Sing was
eligible to resume her citizenship status in 1925. Barring exceptional cases such as those
involving the children of foreign diplomats and Native Americans generally, birth on
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born in the United States must, to achieve citizenship at birth, be
"subject to its jurisdiction.40 This phrase, according to Justice
Miller in the Slaughterhouse Cases, was "intended to exclude from
its operation children of ministers, consuls and citizens or subjects
of foreign States, born within the United States," but was extended to include Native Americans.4'

United States soil invested the person with American citizenship. See United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898). Unfortunately for Sing, and for petitioners in her
circumstances, the Immigration Act of 1924 stipulated:
An immigrant born in the United states who has lost his [sic] United States citizenship shall be considered as having been born in the country of which he is a citizen or
subject.
Immigration Act of 1924, § 12(a). Having thus lost her American citizenship, the court
regarded Sing as ineligible for naturalization as "an excluded race, and a citizen of such
excluded racial country." Ex parte (Ng) Fung Sing, 6 F.2d at 671.
On the Chinese exclusion laws see also Ex parte Goon Dip, 1 F.2d 811(D.C. Wash. 1924); Ex
parte Palo, 3 F.2d 44(D.C. Wash. 1925). Petitioners of Chinese nativity faced insuperable
barriers to U.S. citizenship, having to confront not only the congressional strictures limiting naturalization to "free white persons," but also having to challenge the Act of Congress
of May 6, 1882, excluding Chinese in particular from citizenship: "Hereafter no state court
or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship," and in article 4 of the
convention between China and the United States, ratified on December 9, 1894 providing
that "Chinese laborers or Chinese of any other class, either permanently or temporarily
residing in the United States, shall have, for the protection of their persons and property,
all rights that are given by the laws of the United States to citizens of the most favored
nation, excepting the right to become naturalized citizens." See In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274
(N.D. Ca. 1895).
In 1907, Congress provided, for the first time, that marriage of an American woman to an
alien terminated her American Citizenship. Law of March 2, 1907, ch. 34, § 396 (1916). By
the Act of Sept. 22, 1922, a wife was made independent of the husband both in the acquisition and loss of American citizenship. An alien woman who married a citizen or whose
husband was naturalized, after the passage of the statute, did not become a citizen by reason of those acts, but if eligible to citizenship, she could be naturalized upon her own application and the usual personal fitness qualifications of men. However, courts continued to
fetishize race by finding the limitation of citizenship to 'white persons' only as applicable to
the question of whether a woman was "eligible to citizenship." Additionally, the Act of 1922
provided that "any woman citizen who marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall cease
to be a citizen," while the last section of the Act provided that, "[n]o woman whose husband
is not eligible to citizenship shall be naturalized during the continuance of the marital
status." Law of Sept. 22, 1922.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §2.
41. SlaughterhouseCases 83 U.S. at 73. As the Supreme Court observed in 1898,
The only adjudication that has been made by this court upon the meaning of the
clause, "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," is Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, in
which it was decided that an Indian born a member of one of the Indian tribes within
the United States, which still existed and was recognized as an Indian tribe by the
United States, who had voluntarily separated himself from his tribe, and taken up
his residence among the white citizens of a State, but who did not appear to have
been naturalized, or taxed, or in any way recognized or treated as a citizen, either by
the United States or by the State, was not a citizen of the United States, as a person
born in the United States, "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," within the meaning of the clause in question.
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By the latter half of the nineteenth century, writings both popular and legal evinced concern with an absence of national conformity with regard to the naturalization process. In the 1895 case of
In re Gee Hop, the federal district court for the northern district of
California voided the award of naturalization to Hop by the Court
of Common Pleas in Camden, New Jersey, calling for "conformity
with the uniform laws promulgated by the congress of the United
States.' 2 In the interest of conforming the naturalization process
nationally, Congress established the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization in 1906 in order to "provide for a uniform rule for
the naturalization of aliens throughout the United States.' 3 The
House Committee on Naturalization and Immigration recommended passage of the Act, recording its opinion
that the frauds and crimes which have been committed in regard to naturalization have resulted more from a lack of any
uniform system of procedure in such matters than from any
radical defect in the fundamental principles of existing law
governing in such matters.44
The Committee went on to recommend that prior to naturalization an applicant must be able to read, either in English or her
own language, and must intend to reside permanently in the
United States.45
The Bureau of Naturalization codified the process by which the
federal government intervened in a naturalization petition. Typically a United States attorney would make a preliminary inquiry
concerning the admissibility of the petitioner, favoring or opposing
citizenship. Pursuant to the Act, the United States
shall have the right to appear before any court or courts exercising jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings for the purpose of cross-examining the petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of his petition concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting his right to admission to citizenUnited States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 680 (Addressing the question of citizenship at
birth).
42. In re Gee Hop, 71 F. at 275.
43. Law of June 29, 1906. See also U.S. v. Morena, 245 U.S. 392, 38 Sup. Ct. 151, 62
L.Ed. 359 (1918).
44. Quoted in Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 191-92 (1922).
45. Additionally, the form annexed for declaration of intent to be naturalized as a U.S.
citizen required the applicant to state his color as well as his complexion. See, e.g.,United
States v. Balsara,180 F. 694, 697 (2d Cir. 1910).

390

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 43

ship, and shall have the right to call witnesses, produce evidence and be heard in opposition to the granting of any petition in naturalization proceedings.46
While these hearings were often expected formalities, after 1906
the expectations of the courts were to treat the United States attorney as a litigant party. While codification of the preliminary
inquiry was intended to assist the courts in gathering proof to
subsequently appraise the claimant's petition for citizenship, under the Act this process began to look less like a test for citizenship and more like an advocacy for citizenship, as courts expected
the United States attorneys to assume a litigious position.47
The concern for a national consensus on naturalization also represented a public call for a prophylactic solution to the intermittent acceptance of non-white immigrants. Popular writers of the
period expressed the irregularities and inconsistencies found in
the naturalization process as a national weakness in need of repair to avoid the disease, infection, and degradation trumpeted as
certain to accompany the ready acceptance into citizenship of nonwhite immigrant residents.48
46. Law of June 29, 1906 ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 599 (1909).
47. Thus, Judge Lowell remarked that "[wihere preliminary inquiry has been made;
where the attorney attends at the hearing, and in behalf of the United States examines the
petitioner and his witnesses with the freedom permitted in cross-examination; where the
right to offer additional evidence is fully recognized, being often exercised in like case - the
court is ordinarily justified in restricting its function to a decision as between litigants,"
requiring the United States to "announc[e] its own contention in the matter." In re Mudarri, 176 F. 465, 466 (D. Mass. 1910). Indeed, in Mudarri the United States attorney
initially took no position on the admission of the claimant, a Syrian national, until the
court pointed to its understanding that the Act of 1906 required the government to assume
a litigious posture.
48. See JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO ME: IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN AMERICA (1984) 195
(noting that between 1890 and 1920, the restriction of immigration in the United States
existed to thwart the "evil" of "pollution."); MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT
RACE (1916) 174; LoITHROP STODDARD, THE RISING TIDE OF COLOR AGAINST WHITE WORLDSUPREMACY (1920) 298 (asserting the need for constant vigilance in maintaining the dominant white race against the efforts by other, inferior, races for control, noting "[t]he whole
white race is exposed . . to the possibility of social sterilization and final replacement or
absorption by the teeming colored races."); LOTHROP STODDARD, RE-FORGING AMERICA
(1927) 103 (recasting the defense of American culture from his earlier argument predicated
on racial superiority, to one based on ownership: 'The really important point is that even
though America (abstractly considered) may not be nearly as good as we think it is, nevertheless it is ours .... That is the meat of the matter, and when we discuss immigration we
had better stop theorizing about superior and inferiors and get down to the bedrock of difference.")
We also find these sentiments laced throughout the Congressional Record. Considering the
1924 Johnson-Reed Act further restricting immigration, Congressman Watkins of Oregon
announced "[tihe sooner this Congress lays down the proposition of not admitting the people of those nations who can not assimilate, who can not become a part of our blood, our
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To guard against the cultural, political, and social dissipation
putatively threatened by unchecked immigration, each petitioner
had to convince the court of his or her "good moral character." 9
The shifting language of this judicial inquiry into a claimant's
moral character drew from the parallel shifts in the legal discourse on property, as courts first embraced the conviction of an
innate personal identity suffused with certainty, only later to advance the notion of moral character as a social artifact. For instance, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected saloon-keeper Louis
Hrasky's citizenship petition for lack of "good moral character"
because the Austrian national refused to comply with the Sunday
closing laws in the city of East St. Louis.5" Although the city itself
failed to enforce the ordinance, the court, nevertheless, considered
Hrasky's refusal an intemperate indication of his disqualification
for citizenship for lack of "good moral character."

tongue, our life, and our ways, the sooner will we begin to mirror the sentiments and the
wishes of the great body of Americans who want America for Americans." Congressional
Record 5677 (1924). Congressman Allen observed more pointedly that the "primary reason
for the restriction of the alien stream.. .is the necessity for purifying and keeping pure the
blood of America." Congressional Record 5693 (1924).
49. Pursuant to the Act of 1906:
It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting any alien to citizenship that immediately preceding the date of his application he has resided continuously within the United States five years at least, and within the state or territory where such court is at the time held, one year at least, and that during that time
he has behaved as a man of good moral character and attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same.
Law of June 29, 1906 ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 351. The courts were also directed, under Section 2165 of the Revised Statues, to determine from the evidence whether,
during his residency, the applicant had "behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the constitution, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same."§ 2165. The principle thrust of this statute was to require that the applicant declare an oath to support the constitution and that he "absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state and
sovereignty whatever, and particularly to the one of which he was before a citizen or subject." In re Kanaka Nian, 21 Pac. R. 993, 994 (Utah 1889).
Courts understood this statute to impose a duty to assess the applicant's moral character
from evidence of conduct in an effort, according to one court writing in 1889, to "exclude the
immoral, those who are opposed to the principles of liberty and justice, or are in favor of
anarchy and confusion." In re Kanaka Nian, 21 Pac. R. at 994. The court, in Kanaka Nian,
not only rejected the applicant, a native of the Hawaiian Islands, based on ethnological
classification, but determined that the applicant "did not appear to be possessed of sufficient intelligence to become a citizen; that his intellect and conscience were not sufficiently
enlightened." Id. Offering proof for its position the court noted that while the applicant
had lived in the Utah Territory six years he was unable to read or write in English and was
"unable to mention the name of the president of the United States, but spoke of George
Washington as president." Id.
50. United States v. Hrasky, 88 N.E. 1031 (Ill. 1909)
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In discussing the legal standard for evaluating the "good moral
character" necessary for citizenship, the Hrasky court expressed
the same distinction between character and reputation that other
courts found in the difference between an object centered and a
relationally driven notion of property:
While the word 'character' is frequently used as synonymous
with 'reputation,' strictly speaking, character is what a person
is, while reputation is what he is supposed to be. .... 'The applicant must not simply have sustained a good reputation, but
his conduct must have been such as comports with a good
character. In other words, he must have behaved - conducted
himself - as a man of good moral character ordinarily would,
should, or does. Character consists of the qualities which constitute the individual; reputation the sum of opinions entertained concerning him. The former is interior the latter external. The one is substance; that other the shadow. 1
Viewed differently, in the case of In re Hopp, the federal district
court in Wisconsin expressed the standard for "good moral character" in terms of the community standard of reputation, thereby
collapsing any meaningful legal distinction between character and
reputation and subsuming the former into the latter. 2 As in
Hrasky, the question arose in a petitioner's forum for naturalization in which Hopp, a Milwaukee saloon keeper of "German extraction," refused to abide by the Sunday closing law. Taking
measure of the law's enforcement, the court observed that, in the
forty years in which the law lay on the books, the saloons of Milwaukee had been
kept open on the Sabbath Day, without concealment or disguise. The old German adheres with tenacity to the habits
and customs of the fatherland. He wishes to have the saloon
51. Id. at 1033 (quoting In Re Spenser, 22 F. 921, 923 5 Sawy. 195, 196 (D. Or. 1878). In
In re Spenser, the court held that a full gubernatorial pardon - which the court viewed as
having the same scope as a presidential pardon - did not restore the good character of a
person convicted of perjury who was applying for United States citizenship. In declining to
read Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866), as insulating the offender from any form of
punishment or civil disability resulting from the conviction, the court reasoned that a pardon "does not operate retrospectively. The offender is purged of his guilt, and thenceforth
he is an innocent man; but the past is not obliterated nor the fact that he had committed
the crime wiped out." Id. at 923. Thus the court concluded that the pardoned offender had
not behaved "as a man of good moral character" because "the fact remains, notwithstanding
the pardon, that the applicant was guilty of the crime of perjury." Id.
52. In re Hopp, 179 F. 561 (D.Wis. 1910).
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kept open on Sunday, not for the purpose of revelry or debauch, but as a meeting place for friends and neighbors, and
he looks upon it as his club, where he may associate in a
friendly way with acquaintances, sip his beer, and smoke his
pipe. He views it purely as a social matter.... In short, the
public sentiment of the city is in harmony with the view suggested by the applicant in his testimony.5 3
The court acknowledged the difficulty of ascertaining character
as understood as an innate quality, stating as follows:
It will thus be perceived that Congress has drawn the distinction between moral character as an ultimate fact and good
reputation based on behavior, which must be an inference.
The court merely passes upon behavior, for no human tribunal can search the heart where character is presumed to reside.5 4
In appreciation of this difficulty, the court then established a
standard for gauging "good moral character" that relied not upon
the presumed innate qualities of the self, but upon social relationships, predicated on the tort standard for establishing negligence.
Rather than an "ultimate fact,"
a good moral character is one that measures up as good
among the people of the community in which the party lives;
that is, up to the standard of the average citizen. Ordinary
care is the test of liability in every case of negligence. This
standard is arrived at, not by the overcautious or the reckless
man, but by the average man, representing the great mass of
men. So here, where the law says a good moral character, it
means such a reputation as will pass muster with the average
man. It need not rise above the level of the common mass of
people.55
The consequent test for "good moral character" merely reinscribed the importance of assimilation as the means by which the
property of national character would not be altered:

53. Id. at 562.
54. Id. at 562-63.
55. Id. at 563.
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Applying this test to the particular case, we find that the
views and behavior of the applicant are in accord with the
overwhelming majority of the people in this community. It is
not contended that the applicant must be able to rise to such
moral elevation that he may analyze, criticize, and reject the
prevailing opinions and settled convictions of his fellowmen,
and in the clear blue of righteousness choose for himself a
course of action dictated by his quickened conscience. To
meet such a test a man must be a philosopher, while the statute is satisfied with a citizen whose behavior is up to the level
of the average citizen. I cannot see that the applicant should
be denied citizenship because he has fallen in with the general public sentiment of the community in which he lives. 6
Ruminations on the issue of "good moral character" proved fertile ground for the courts to examine the legal distinctions between personal character and individual reputation. The terms
assigned to personal character closely aligned with judicial views
on innate authenticity and the objectivity of the self, while the
language of reputation resonated with external contingency and
the subjectivity of social relationships. In this dichotomy, between
objectivity and subjectivity, character expressed the innate property of the self while reputation stood as the community's expression of the individual. In like fashion, judicial musings on "good
moral character" articulated the legal tensions at play in citizenship determinations, between an appreciation of personality as a
coherent property and its reconsideration as a set of social relationships.
IV. LOOKING FOR WHITENESS

Between the 1860s and the 1920s, federal and state courts
across America entertained countless requests from resident immigrants for naturalization to American citizenship. Those petitions for citizenship represented a polyglot of claimants, yet, by
statute, each applicant had to qualify as a "free white person. "57
As petitioners sought to prove themselves "white persons" within
the ambit of the law, their efforts often translated into exhaustive
legal, ethnographic, and cultural narratives of the claimants' requisite physical and mental attributes, racial and geographic ori56. Id.
57. Supra at note 7.
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gins, and racial and familial lineage. The historical record provided scant explanation for the term "free white persons" deployed
by Congress in 1790, leaving the courts with little but their own
considered inflections upon which to fashion a legal standard. 8 In
so doing, courts drew upon shifting property rules to establish the
meaning of race, nation and citizenship.
As the legal interpretation of property and personality shifted,
so also did the judicial justifications for prohibiting non-white citizenship. Naturalization determinations and the debates they engendered exemplified a ready rationale by which legal practitioners and cultural critics might shape and respond to the emerging
legal discourse regarding property, citizenship, and race, as that
discourse embodied the move from an appreciation of property and
identity as a coherent object, to an understanding of property and
personality as relational and contingent. These decisions shaped
the legal boundaries of race, nation, and citizenship, as they also
telegraphed the shifting judicial posture toward conceptions of
personality and property.
In deliberating the "priceless possession" of citizenship, judges
and legal advocates advanced several different justifications for
regarding whether the petitioner embodied whiteness.5 9 The California Circuit Court acknowledged the difficulty of determining
whiteness when, in review of the naturalization petition of Ah
Yup, a native of China, Judge Sawyer observed in 1878:
The words 'white person,' . . . taken in a strictly literal sense,
constitute a very indefinite description of a class of persons,
where none can be said to be literally white, and those called
white may be found of every shade from the lightest blonde to
the most swarthy brunette. °
58. In re Mohan Singh, 257 F. 209 (N.D. Ca.1919). Adopted by Congress in the immigration statute of 1790, and codified repeatedly during the course of the 19th and early
20th centuries, the term "free white persons" reflected the influence of naturalization laws
already in place among the American colonies, most notably South Carolina, which in 1786,
enacted a bill providing for the naturalization of "all free white persons." As a canon of
statutory construction, courts construe a legislative act according to the intention of the
legislature at the time of its enactment, finding that intention through the words of the
statute and not from conjecture aliunde. Faced with the ambiguity of the phrase "white
persons," courts had other devices at their disposal for interpreting intention, such as the
debates preceding the enactment and the political culture during the authorization of the
act.
59. Supra note 5.
60. In re Ah Yup, 1 F. 223 (D. Ca. 1878). While not running the entire gambit of justifications in his opinion, Judge Sawyer nevertheless found legal legitimacy in ethnological
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To discern whiteness, courts in the decades preceding the 1920s
variously relied upon explanations of physical appearance, racial
origin, ethnographic classification, geographic location, and "common understanding" to sustain their determinations.
In regulating a petitioner's access to the property of citizenship,
courts first employed the nineteenth century logic of property, fixing on the object of appearance or race that might render the
meaning of whiteness certain. Courts reflected and reproduced
the tensions manifested in the changing conception of property,
between the logic of property as a fixed object of immutable value
and the expression of property as a set of social relationships from
which value is conferred onto some object. Consequently, just as
the legal logic of property fragmented during this period, so also
did the judicial evaluations of whiteness, as courts engaged in the
unfolding appreciation of property, not as a separate, coherent
entity, but as associational, sequential, and situational.
Late nineteenth century courts, considering whether an applicant for naturalization possessed whiteness, largely centered their
determinations on the petitioner's physical appearance.6 1 In reclassifications, records of congressional debates for the 1870 amendment, and common
parlance. The court relied upon, and recited, the ethnological classifications championed by
Blumenbach, Buffon, Linnaeus and Cuvier Id. Of the phrase "white person," the court
observed,
[T]hese words in this country, at least, have undoubtedly acquired a well settled
meaning in common popular speech, and they are constantly used in the sense so acquired in the literature of the country, as well as in common parlance, As ordinarily
used everywhere in the United states, one would scarcely fail to understand that the
party employing the words "white person" would intend a person of the Caucasian
race.
Id. Reliance on common parlance in this instance signaled the elision of time in an effort to
fix the linguistic description, equating the present and the past. Fixing descriptive terms
by removing their temporal meaning, collapsed the term into the present and robbed any
historical change in meaning. Consequently, early Irish and Italian immigrants, who were
not viewed as racially white, do not have a racial history in this narrative. Nor does Judge
Sawyer's observation leave room to acknowledge early census reports in which the term
"free white person" was merely a means for Congress to draw a line in 1790 between immigrant slaves from Africa and all other immigrants. Further, the courts controlled the designation of "white person" by naming the "common parlance;" it was a democratic gesture
of judicial valuation, a means for the courts to retain democratic legitimacy, by "appealing"
to community opinion, while exercising judicial fiat, by determining the form and content of
the community.
61. In the specific instance of naturalization cases involving military personnel of
mixed-race parentage, the legal discourse drew upon the equation of blood and property
rather than color, an equivalency exhibited in judicial opinions on racial identity in the
American South. Courts of the segregated American South developed a legal approach in
their race misrecognition decisions that equated presumed blood quantum with racial identity as a property of the individual self. In the naturalization cases involving military veterans, the courts assessed whether a petitioner possessed enough white racial lineage to
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viewing Shebatas Saito's application for naturalization, the district court of Massachusetts in 1894 explained its denial by noting
that, as a native of Japan, the petitioner did not possess the necessary attributes of whiteness which, aside from the "most imporwarrant citizenship. Such a judicial exercise extended the legal equivalency of blood quantum with the property of the self to encompass the scope of a national body politic as an
expression of national identity. In re En Sk Song, 271 F. 23, 24 (S.D. Ca. 1921); In re
Geronimo Para;In re Zasuechi Narasaki, 269 F. 642, 647 (S.D. N.Y. 1919). See also Bessho
v. United States, 178 F. 245 (4th Cir. 1910).
In the 1909 case of In re Knight, 171 F. 299 (S.D. N.Y. 1909) for instance, the court concerned itself with the vexing question of whether the claimant, whose "father was an Englishman, and his mother half Chinese and half Japanese," should be classified as a "white
person." Id. at 299. See also Petition of Easurk Emsen Charr ( W.D. Mo. 1921) (denying
naturalization to a native of Korea, "owing allegiance to and a subject of the Mikado of
Japan," residing in Missouri who was drafted into the army in 1918 and received an honorable discharge); In re Buntaro Kumagai, 163 F. 922 (W.D. Wash. 1908) (limiting the application of § 2166 authorizing the naturalization of aliens honorably discharged from military
service to "free, white persons and to aliens of African nativity, and to persons of African
descent," under § 2169, thereby denying Kumagai's petition for naturalization due to Japanese ancestry, though he was an enlisted soldier in the regular army of the United States
with proof of an honorable discharge); In re Rallos, 241 F. 686 (E.D. N.Y. 1917)(where the
court denied the claimant's petition for naturalization, a native of the Philippines and honorably discharged from the U.S. military).
The court made only passing reference to Knight's twenty-seven years of honorable service
in the United States Navy. Concluding that Knight could not be classified as a "white
person" because he "belongs to neither of those races... is literally a half-breed," Knight,
171 F. at 299. The court relied on In re Camille's determination that petitioner Frank
Camille, whose "father was a white Canadian and his mother an Indian woman of British
Columbia," could not be considered a "white person"predicated on race amalgamation cases
in Louisiana, South Carolina and Ohio. In re Camille, 6 F. 256 (D. Or. 1880); see also, In re
Lampitoe, (S.D. N.Y. 1916) in which Judge Learned Hand determined that petitioner Lampitoe, the son of a Filipino mother and a father who was half Filipino and half Spanish, was
not a "free white person" within the meaning of the Congressional statute regulating naturalization. The court expressed its reasoning in terms of ownership rather than behavior,
enunciating an objective racial identity as the litmus test for national character.
Likewise, in 1912 a court found Albert Henry Young, born in Yokohama, Japan, the son of
a German father and a Japanese mother, ineligible to be admitted as a citizen of the United
States "for the reason that he is not a white man." In re Young, 198 F. at 717. Upon petition for rehearing, Judge Cushman addressed Young's mixed-race parentage by relying on
the blood-quantum decisions of courts in the American south:
In the abstractions of higher mathematics, it may be plausibly said that the half of
infinity is equal to the whole of infinity; but in the case of such a concrete thing as
the person of a human being it cannot be said that one who is half white and half
brown or yellow is a white person, as commonly understood.
Id. at 717. In a seemingly contradictory tone, the court also noted, "It is not necessary to
determine the exact status of the petitioner. All that is necessary is to determine whether
he is a 'white person' within the meaning of the law." Id. Thus, the court suggested that
white racial status required pure blood, untainted by the blood of other races that might
serve to cloud the title of the petitioner's "exact status." Race admixture always clouded
title to whiteness. Just as courts in the American south validated the legal mimesis between blood and title in resolving claims to personal racial identity, courts extended this
equivalency to national identity and validated the proprietary title to citizenship that blood
conveyed. See J. Allen Douglas, The "Most Valuable Sort of Property": Constructing White
Identity in American Law, 1880-1940, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 881, 886-90 (2003).
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tant criterion" of color, also included "conformation of skull, structure and arrangement of hair and the general contour of the
face."
The court observed that "both in ancient and modem
times, the races of mankind have been distinguished by difference
in color, and they have been classified as the white, black, yellow
and brown races.6 3 Relying on the racial classifications of eighteenth and nineteenth century naturalists, such as Blumenbach,'
Cuvier,6 5 and Huxley,66 the court concluded that "the color of the
skin" marked the singular "distinction of race."67 Likewise, the
Supreme Court of Utah denied the application of Kanaka Nian, in
1889, because he did not have a "white" appearance.6 8 In the case
of Frank Camille's petition for naturalization, the court relied on
race amalgamation cases from Ohio to deny citizenship.69 The
court noted that Camille's father was a "white Canadian" and his
mother an "Indian woman of British Columbia," and concluded
62. In re Saito, 62 F. 126, 127. (D. Mass 1894). The court reasoned that Japanese and
Chinese could not have been contemplated as "white persons" at the time of the codification
of the statute in 1802, recounting that
[alt that time the country was inhabited by three races, the Caucasian or white race,
the Negro or black race, and the American or red race. It is reasonable, therefor to
infer that when Congress, in designating the class of persons who could be naturalized, inserted the qualifying word "white," it intended to exclude from the privilege of
citizenship all alien races except the Caucasian.
Id. at 126. The court, as most courts before and after, did not address whether the term
"free" bore any significance. As we shall see later, a few courts recognized the limitation of
citizenship to "free white persons" as a means of avoiding the grant of citizenship to then
bonded servants and slaves, regardless of race. See Halladjian infra at note 153.
63. Id.
64. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach was a German naturalist who studied comparative
anatomy and craniology. Blumenbach proposed a five-fold division of the human family
based on geological variables and psychological characteristics in the third edition, published in 1795, of doctoral thesis, the influential ON THE NATURAL VARIETIES OF MANKIND
(tr. 1865) 1775.
65. Georges Cuvier was a nineteenth century French paleontologist who integrated the
study of organismal function into the study of form and regarded animal species as fixed
rather than evolutionary.
66. Thomas Henry Huxley was a nineteenth century English paleontologist, zoologist,
and biologist.
67. Id. As the court noted "Blumenbach, in 1781, divided mankind into five principal
types, the Caucasian or white, Mongolian or yellow, Ethiopian or black, American or red,
and Malay or brown.... Prof. Huxley... distinguishes four principal types, and he points
out the marked physical characteristics of each. These types are the Australioid (chocolate
brown), Negroid (brown black), Mongoloid (yellow), and Xanthochroic (fair whites.) To
these he added a fifth variety, the Melanochroic (dark whites)."Id. at 128.
68. In re Kanaka Nian, 21 Pac. R. 993 (Utah 1889).
69. In re Camille, 6 F. 256, 257 (D. Or. 1880). Judge Deady noted Louisiana's racial
demarcations and followed Ohio in concluding that "where the colored blood was equal to or
preponderated over the white blood, the person was not white."(Citing Jeffries v. Ankeny,
11 Ohio, 372; Gray v. The State, 4 Ohio, 353; Thacker v. Hawk, 11 Ohio, 377; Lane v. Baker,
12 Ohio, 237).
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that "[iin all classifications of mankind hitherto, color has been a
controlling circumstance, and for that reason Indians have never,
ethnologically, been considered white persons, or included in any
such designation."7 ° However, Judge Newman of the federal district court in Georgia determined, in 1909, that Costas George
Najour should receive citizenship because, as a Syrian from Beirut, "he was not particularly dark and ha[d] none of the characteristics or appearance of the Mongolian race."7 ' Within the object
70. In re Camille, 6 F. at 257. The 1870 revision of the naturalization statute to include persons of "African descent" and "African nativity" drew this racially laden response
from Judge Deady:
[U]nder the pro-negro feeling, generated and inflamed by the war with the southern
states, and its political consequences, congress was driven at once to the other extreme [of only granting petitions for white persons], and opened the door, not only to
persons of African descent, but to all those "of African nativity"-thereby proffering
the boon of American citizenship to the comparatively savage and strange inhabitants of the "dark continent," while withholding it from the intermediate and muchbetter-qualified red and yellow races.
Id. at 257-58.
Courts had difficulty, in the main, with the clause "free white persons," but the few who
also addressed the construction of the term "African nativity," found the clause equally
prone to cause judicial dyspepsia. After noting that by statutory provision "the Chinese are
expressly excluded" from citizenship, one court found itself in a quandary with the question: "Suppose one of these people had been born in Africa, would the children of Chinese
parents, for instance, or Japanese parents, because born in Africa, be of African nativity?"
Ex Parte Shahid, 205 F. 812, 813 (E.D. S.C. 1913). The courts repeatedly imagined this
avenue toward citizenship to open the floodgates of eligible applicants.
For instance, the Act of June 29, 1906 extended to "all person" in the Philippines and
Puerto Rico, and who became residents of a state of the United States, the right to declare
their intention to apply for citizenship, so far as the "applicable provisions of the naturalization law" provide the right. Philippine petitioners sought to demonstrate that the Act
enabled their eligibility for citizenship but he courts determined the provisions of the Act
were subject to the application of the naturalization law restricting citizenship to "free
white persons." Otherwise, as one court noted with some anxiety, "[a] contrary interpretation would mean that Chinese, Japanese, and Malays could become citizens if they were
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, so as to become citizens of the Philippines under the
laws following the Spanish War, and if they thereafter moved to the United States." In re
Rallos, 241 F. 686, 687 (E.D. N.Y. 1917). The extension of the American flag to subject
nations through imperialist ventures served to complicate the meaning and achievement of
U.S. citizenship. It served to redefine the citizen community, established a tiered system of
entitlement and proved paradoxical as the flag crossed the Pacific.
71. In re Najour, 174 F. 735 (N.D. Ga.1909). For his distinctions of racial categories,
Judge Newman relied on Dr. A-H. Keane who classified Syrians as part of the "Caucasian
or white race." Id The government found important for disqualification the fact that Najour had been born "within the dominions of Turkey, and was heretofore a subject of the
sultan of Turkey." Of this position the judge noted, "I do not think this should cut any
figure in the matter. If it did, the extension of the Turkish Empire over people unquestionably of the white race would deprive them of the privilege of naturalization." Id. at 736.
What we find here is a glimpse of the government's strategy to argue the position that
"free white person" equated not to race per se but to nation, and Turkey was not one of the
nations originally contemplated by those forming the restrictions on naturalization. The
facility with which the government was able to maintain both positions, white is race and
nation, points to the strong equivalency during this period of race nationalism.
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paradigm of property, appearance and color presumptively provided the avenue by which judges could render the meaning of
whiteness unified and immutable.
Ultimately, however, attributes of color and appearance proved
uncertain markers for judicial boundary-tending of racial identity.
Writing in 1909, one court, recognizing whiteness as an ambiguous yardstick for race in its naturalization decision, garnered support from French anthropologist Paul Topinard, who forwarded
the following notion:
Race in the present state of things is an abstract conception, a
notion of continuity in discontinuity, of unity in diversity. It
is the rehabilitation of a real but directly unattainable thing.7 2
Another court, expressing the difficulty of determining race,
noted its frustration with the judicial association of "white" with
color in 1913, stating,
72. In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 840(D. Mass. 1909). (Quoting PAUL TOPINARD,
ELEMENTS OF A GENERAL ANTHROPOLOGY, 166-16). Topinard was a student of Paul Broca, a
French anatomist who founded the Societe d' Anthropologie de Paris in 1859, the general
aim of which was the scientific study of the human races, each set apart from the other by
primordial differences. Broca effectively founded professional anthropology in France and
his school served as the model when anthropology grew in other countries. As one critic
has noted, Broca's school came from "the tradition of typological essentialism inherited
from Medieval Neoplatonism." C.L. Brace, Biocultural Interactionand the Mechanism of
Mosaic Evolution in the Emergence of "Modern"Morphology. AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
697, 711-721(1995). Topinard became increasingly agnostic as to the reality of homogeneous races. By 1879 he had concluded that there was "nowhere in the world.., a population
completely untouched by intermixture and manifesting a single type." Race, then could only
be considered in terms of the type concept; as Topinard put it in 1885, "races are hereditary
types." To recreate these types out of the heterogeneity of modern mixed populations was
the tremendously difficult task of the physical anthropologist. But once accomplished, it
produced only an imaginary entity: "At the present time rarely, if indeed ever, [do] we
discover a single individual corresponding to our racial type in every detail." To prove the
hereditary continuity of these types in time was "in the present state of affairs" virtually
impossible. But "race"resided precisely in this "uninterrupted continuity," which by 1892
Topinard described as at best a "hypothesis," "convenient for study, but impossible to demonstrate." The conclusion was obvious: physical anthropology should devote itself to the
investigation of types and leave open the question of their hereditary persistence. As one
later writer put it, physical anthropology had through the development of anthropometric
techniques reached a point where its "most notable" representative urged that its principal
problem be abandoned "because research into type and the mathematical treatment of
metric data do not reveal the 'pure races'." Indeed, "this particular idea" - "the notion that
the representatives of a 'pure race' must all fit or approximate a calculated average" - had
"undoubtedly turned out to be a disastrous Grecian gift to anthropology." WILLIAM Z.
RIPLEY, RACES OF EUROPE, 108 (1900) (a Harvard economics professor, Ripley's writings on
American immigration policy were, in concert with many writers of the period, protectionist
and assimilationist; Ripley, however, portrayed a taste for the alarmist when, in the Sunday New York Times on June 22, 1913, he pronounced in a full-page advertisement that
"the hordes of new immigrants" were "a menace to our Anglo Saxon civilization").
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Then, what is white? What degree of colorization, if it be referred to color, constitutes a white person as against a colored
person, and is the court to take the responsibility by ocular
inspection of determining the shades of different colorization
where the dividing line comes between white and colored."
The court's difficulty with categorizing racial identity reflected a
wider judicial concern over the growing tenuousness between personality and its properties, and represented a specific call for the
erection of objective property rules regarding individual identity to
aid the courts in determining who might validly acquire the rights
of citizenship.
V. THE SCIENCE OF WHITENESS
In their search for an objective means by which to assess the
character of the self and the property of citizenship, courts found
their most sustained justification in the classifications of ethnologists and anthropologists. Relying on the divisions adopted in the
writings of Blumenbach, Brinton7 4 Keane,75 and others,"6 these
courts equated the term "white" with the categories of Caucasian
and Aryan. In the early case of In re Ah Yup, Judge Sawyer admitted that the words "free white persons," taken literally, constituted an indefinite class of people, wherein no person was actually
white and those understood as white might be found in every
shade.7 Judge Sawyer surmounted this difficulty by proposing
that the phrase signified a person of the Caucasian race, thereby
establishing the deus ex machina ready to be deployed as the solution in future naturalization cases.
While putatively scientific, that ethnological classification
rested upon subjective distinctions of physical characteristics including hair, skull, complexion, and color to identify as many as
five separate racial groupings, predicated on anatomy, but also
presuming parallel psychological distinctions." Thus, buttressed
by the seeming legitimacy of the "science of race," the federal dis73. Ex Parte Shahid, 205 F. 812, 813 (E.D. S.C. 1913).
74. Brinton, Races and People (1901) 99, 105, 132, 137 (cited in In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002
(D. Or. 1910)).
75. Keane, World's People (1908) 307, 310, 335, 337 (cited in In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002 (D.
Or. 1910)).
76. Deniker, Races of Man (1900) 423 (cited in In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002 (D. Or. 1910)).
77. In re Ah Yup, 1 F. 223, supra note 59.
78. See supra note 64.
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trict court in Oregon admitted the application of Tom Ellis, a native of Syria, for citizenship, as the court determined that Ellis
was "white ethnologically speaking" and could be classified as a
member of the Caucasian race.79 On the other hand, in 1894 the
City Court of Albany, New York, denied petitioner San Po's claims
for naturalization because, as a native of Burma, the court regarded him, ethnologically, as Mongolian and therefore not
"white."8 0
Writing for the Utah Supreme Court, Chief Justice Zane offered
a review of the current ethnographic classifications in concluding
that the claimant before the court, Kanaka Nian of Hawaii, was
"Malayan or Mongolian.""l Judge Zane noted that Blumenbach
partitioned the "human family" into five separate racial groups:
"Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, Malay, and American." 2 Zane
further observed that Cuvier, followed by Jacquinot, had narrowed
Blumenbach's groups to three, namely "the Caucasian, Mongolian,
and Ethiopian, treating the Malay and American as subdivisions
of the Mongolian," while also noting that Professor Huxley divided
racial classifications into "Austrialians, Negroes, Mongols, and
Whites, dividing the whites into the fair white and the dark
whites." 3 In yearning for the best science available, Judge Zane
turned to the "highest authorities," Prof. Van Rhyn's article on
Malayo-Polynesian Races and Languages in American Cyclopedia
and Rev. J.F. Whitmee's article on Polynesia in Encyclopaedia
Britannica, to determine that as a Hawaiian Kanaka Nian would
be classified among the "Malay tribes," and thus would be ineligible for naturalization."
79. In re Ellis, 179 F. at 1004. Ellis illustrated a common malady among courts hearing
many of the naturalization cases. The Ellis court observed that the term "white' ethnologically speaking, was intended to be applied in its popular sense to denote at least the members of the white or Caucasian race of people." Id. Consequently, the courts demanded that
the term "white" serve double duty, stretching its metaphorical properties between the
popular or common understanding and the scientific or ethnological determination.
80. In re Po, 28 NY Supp. 383, 384 (City Court of Albany 1894).
81. In re Kanaka Nian, 21 Pac. R. at 993. See also In re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 163
(California 1890), (denying petitioner's motion to practice as an attorney). Under California code claimant had to present a license to practice in the highest court of another state
and hold U.S. citizenship. Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 279. Chang was licensed to practice in all of
the courts of New York and held a certificate of naturalization from the court of common
pleas of the city of New York, November 11, 1887. However, the Supreme Court of California found that because Chang was of "Mongolian nativity" he was not eligible for citizenship.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Indeed, so pervasive was the ethnologic explanation that by
1911, the Immigration Commission compiled a "Dictionary of
Races or Peoples" that it reported to the Sixty-First Congress."5
Chaired by William Dillingham, the report aspired to provide the
"immigrant inspector or the enumerator in the field" with a means
of classifying the "true racial status" of newly arrived immigrants
rather than resorting to the "old method of recording arrivals only
by the country of their nativity [which] was of little value in determining [their] ethnical status."8 6 While the Dillingham Commission disavowed any attempt, in its 150-page report, at "an
original discussion of anthropology or ethnology," it nevertheless
predicated the report's racial categories on the divisions employed
by Blumenbach in 1775, between the Caucasian, Ethiopian, Mongolian, Malay, and American races.87 The Commission resorted to
those racial divisions as "entirely justified by the generally prevailing custom in the United States" to separate the races into five
"grand divisions" based upon physical or somatological grounds.8 8
Relying on the Dillingham Commission's report, the Fourth Circuit court awarded citizenship to George Dow, a native of Syria,
predicated on the Commission's "conceptions of race divisions":
Physically the modern Syrians are of mixed Syrian, Arabian,
and even Jewish blood. They belong to the Semitic branch of
the Caucasian race, thus widely differing from their rulers,
the Turks, who are in origin Mongolian.8 9
Surveying a litany of ethnologist's writing on the subject the
court found applicable the "definite and general knowledge" of re-

85. Report of the Immigration Commission, Senate Document No. 662, 61st Congress,
Third Session (1911).
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 3. After determining the "five great races," predicated on physical qualities
such as color, hair, and shape of the head, the report made further divisions based largely
on linguistic classifications. The report opted not for conversational language, but ancestral
language as an immigrant's racial identifier, noting that "[tihe historical limit which determines the transition from one race into another as thus defined varies with different
races. It will be assumed in this article that the English race is practically one thousand
years old, since the essential elements composing it were welded before or soon after the
Norman invasion." Id. at 55.
89. Dow v. United States, 226 F. 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1915). The Commission's report
included Syrian, Hindi, Hebrew, Arabian and Basque peoples among the Caucasian race,
and thus, presumably capable of naturalization as "white persons." Commission Report at
5.
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cent "racial science."9" Similarly, a district court in California relied on the Dillingham Report to accept the petition of Mohan
Singh, a "high caste Hindu" and native of India.9 Adopting racial
categories over appearance, the court observed:
"Caucasians" are "white," whether they live under the tropic
sun, and therefore have a very dark skin, or abide in northern
climes, and possess a light one, the possession of a "common
racial stamp" is the basis of classification.9"
Through ethnologic considerations, courts admitted applicants
to citizenship from Syria, India, and from what the courts invariably termed "Persia."93
Indeed, the judiciary's reliance on the language and terms of
ethnographers and anthropologists in deciding naturalization
cases indicated the extent of the legal efforts to associate property
and race with citizenship and objectivity. The categories of ethnographic "science" provided direction and certainty to a judiciary
struggling to apply the phrase "free white persons," lending legitimacy and rationality to the judiciary's naturalization determinations. Additionally, the discourse of the science of race used in
tandem with an emerging legal discourse of identity, instantiated
whiteness in the body of the individual as a primordial characteristic of the self, an objective attribute of property. Thus, the
courts might now attempt to secure a petitioner's race and, hence
citizenship aspirations in the seemingly objective recitation of the
blood lineage and racial family grouping of ethnography.

90. Id. The court noted that while the basis of Blumenbach's divisions, known in the
United States after the 1807 english edition, had been discarded, the divisions themselves
remained viable in the work of subsequent ethnologists:
The opinions of later writers are in accord with Blumenbach's that Syrians are to be
classed as white people. Pritchard, Natural History of Man, 1848; Pickering, Races of
Man ,1851; Figuier, The Human Race, 1872; Jeffries, Natural History of the Human
Race, 1869; Brinton, Races and Peoples, 1901; Kean, World's Peoples, 1908.
Id. at 146. While, the court admitted, the racial categories propounded by ethnologists
were not in evidence at the inception of the naturalization act in 1790, the repeated repeal
and re-enactment of the statute throughout the course of the nineteenth century compelled
the court to "look to the meaning which the words had at the time of the new enactment" in
1875 when Congress amended the law by inserting the limiting words, "being free white
persons and aliens;" terms it had omitted in 1873 when it extended naturalization to
"aliens of African nativity and African descent." Id.
91. In re Mohan Singh, 257 F. 209, 212 (S.D. Ca. 1919).
92. Id. (citing A.H. Kean, MAN, PAST AND PRESENT (1900) 448.).
93. In re Mudarri, 176 F. 465 (D. Mass. 1910) (Judge Lowell also penned In re Halladfian the previous year).
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Consider, for instance, the petition for citizenship of Akhay
Kumar Mozumdar, a native of India.94 Before the federal district
court in Washington in 1912, Mozumdar's initial hearing elicited
only "very meager" testimony concerning whether the petitioner
was a "white person within the meaning of the Naturalization
Acts."95 Of the claimant, Judge Rudkin noted that he was "not
fully satisfied that he was a white person," and denied Mozumdar's petition without prejudice, allowing Mozumdar to file a petition for rehearing if he so desired. In his petition for reconsideration, Mozumdar adopted the discourse of race property and objectivity so central to grants of citizenship. In his affidavit testimony
to the court, Mozumdar recounted his lineage:
I come from the northern part of India, from the part of India
that is customarily spoken of as Upper India, or what is
known as Hindustan proper. I am a high-caste Hindu of pure
blood, belonging to what is known as the warrior caste, or ruling caste. The pure-blooded Hindus are divided into three
castes - the priestly caste, the warrior or ruling caste, and the
merchant caste. The blood is kept pure by rigid rules of exclusion. Any one who marries outside of his caste is ostracized, and is disinherited by the native law. None of the highcast Hindus will have anything to do with him. Marriage outside of the caste is not often known. Very few of the highcaste Hindus come to the United States. The great bulk of
the Hindus in this country are not high caste Hindus, but are
what are called Sikhs, and are of mixed blood. The laboring
class, those who do the rough manual labor, are not highcaste Hindus at all, but are in an entirely separate class, having quite different religion and a different ancestry. The
high-caste Hindus are of Brahmin faith, and in India are
clearly distinguished from all of the other inhabitants, including the aborigines of the country, or the hill tribes, and also
the descendants of the invaders, those of the Mohammedan
94. In re Akhay Kumar Mozumdar, 207 F. 115 (E.D. Wash. 1913). The court was quite
candid concerning the vague direction they had been given by Congress, with Judge Rudkin
observing,
In the original naturalization act the expression "free white persons" was doubtless
primarily intended to include the white emigrants from Northern Europe, with whom
the Congress of that day was familiar, and to exclude Indians and persons of African
descent or nativity. Beyond this, perhaps, Congress had no definite object in view.
Id. at 117.
95. Id. at 116.
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faith. The high-caste Hindus comprise perhaps one-fourth of
the native of India. The high-caste Hindus always consider
themselves to be members of the Aryan race, and their native
term for Hindustan is Arya-vartha, which means country or
land of the Aryans.96
Within the context of citizenship, blood was the discourse of probity. As judges sit before these naturalization petitioners they
are, as in most areas of the law, asked to draw distinctions and
establish certainty in reasoning toward a legal conclusion. The
tropes and categories of ethnographic science provided courts the
edifice of objectivity through which they might stabilize property
and identity through their mutual association. The discourse of
blood purity was the metonymical trope used to confirm the title
to whiteness as an object of property that resided in both person
and polis, an attribute of the individual body and of the body politic. The judicial maintenance of these personal and political
boundaries, through miscegenation or naturalization laws, served
9 7
as Judge Rudkin admitted, to "prevent corruption of the blood."
However, concurrent with the Congressional effort to rationalize
racial classification, judicial doubt emerged regarding the application of the "science of race" to the vague term "white persons" in
restricting citizenship. In 1910, Judge Lowell of Massachusetts
expressed his frustration in a decision admitting the petition of a
Syrian national to citizenship, by calling on Congress to "make
quite clear the meaning of the word 'white."' 98 The absence of a
consensus among ethnologists regarding racial classification led
Judge Lowell to observe anxiously:
To make naturalization depend upon [the invalid CaucasianMongolian] classification is to make an important result depend upon the application of an abandoned scientific theory, a
Issues of blood purity escalated in importance as an immigrant
96. Id. at 116-17.
petitioner's place of origin deviated further, geographically as well as culturally, from
Europe. However, the issue of mixed European races, while registering some concern in
the courts, posed little problem in this legal narrative because the structure of the geographic litmus test itself - white equals European - precluded racial identity as a first
order question. Several cases held Hindus eligible for naturalization: In re Mohan Singh,
257 F. 209 (S.D. Cal. 1919); In re Bhagat Singh Thind, 268 F. 683 (D. Or. 1920); In re Das,
reported in The Recorder, San Francisco, June 6, 1914, oral opinion by U.S. District Judge
Dooling (N.D. Cal.); In re Sudhindra Bose (Ms. Opinion) Feb 19, 1917, Iowa District Court
for Johnson County. The census of 1920 shows there to have been 2,507 Hindus permanently residing in the United States. 14th Census, Vol. III, p. 15, Table 1.
97. Id. at 117.
98. Id. at 467.
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course of proceeding which surely brings the law and its administration into disrepute. Here it is impossible to substitute a modem and accepted theory for one which has been
abandoned. No modern theory has gained general acceptance.
Hardly any one classifies any human race as white, and none
can be applied under [the Naturalization Act] without making
distinctions which Congress certainly did not intend to draw;
e.g., a distinction between the inhabitants of different parts of
France. Thus classification by ethnological race is almost or
quite impossible.9
By the second decade of the twentieth century the judicial reliance on pronouncements ethnologic, to determine the meaning
and content of whiteness, began to fall out of favor. As one legal
writer observed in 1916, the penchant for relying on ethnography
to equate "white persons" with the Caucasian race meant extending the privilege of citizenship on the basis of fraud:
The privilege is conferred only upon members of the Caucasian race! The courts might as well have said that the privilege is conferred upon the Anthropophagi! There is no Caucasian race, and if there ever was one, it ran its course and long
since has been laid away with Adamic man, the geocentric
universe, and other "scientific" lunar rainbows, in the necropolis of exploded heresies. °°
Rejection of scientific emplotments of racial family groups escalated enough by 1928 that, in a terse denial of a petition for naturalization from a native of Afghanistan, the court sniffed,
What ethnologists, anthropologists, and other so-called scientists may speculate and conjecture in respect to races and origins may interest the curious and convince the credulous, but

99. Id.
100. Otto Erickson, "Naturalization and Ethnology," 20 LAW NOTES 24, 25 (1916).
Erickson goes on to note that
all scholars are in accord with Huxley [in his "Methods and Results of Ethnology"]
that the Caucasian race is a Blumenbachian myth. And in the light of present day
knowledge the rule of our courts becomes the more absurd, for if it were to be applied
literally it would extend the privileges of naturalization to an excluded class, for it is
now agreed among anthropologists that the race inhabiting the Caucasus must be
classified as Mongolian.

408

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 43

is of no moment in arriving at the intent of Congress in the
statute. 101
Another court complained that "the meaning of Caucasian, as at
one time prevalent, has been now practically exploded," and
warned of "the Serbonian bog into which a court or judge will
plunge that attempts to make the words 'white persons' conform to
any racial classification."" 2
The tenor of the denunciation of ethnographic inquiry by court
and counsel suggests that the courts sought an objectivity of terms
and statutory construction that might legitimize the property
rights they were granting to those awarded citizenship. It also
suggests that courts sought interpretive techniques that might
better guarantee the relative autonomy of the judicial decisionmaking process, one unwilling to rely on the increasingly inclusive
ambit of the racial lines drawn by ethnographic experts. 1°3 Thus,
ignoring the multiple revisions of the naturalization statute between its eighteenth century inception and the early twentieth
century, courts sought the meaning of "free white persons" as that
which "would naturally have been given to it when used in the
first naturalization act of 1790.""°

VI. THE GEOGRAPHY OF RACE
As an alternative to the ethnologic yardstick, the government,
in its briefs opposing particular applicants, maintained the mean101. In re Feroz Din, 27 F.2d 568,568 (N.D. Ca. 1928). Relying on the decision in United
States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 to deny the naturalization petition of Feroz Din, a native of

Afghanistan who the court found "readily distinguishable from 'white' persons of this country, and approximates to Hindus." Id.
102. In re Dow, 213 F. 355, 364 (D.S.C. 1914).
103. As one court observed,
This may not, ethnologically or physiologically speaking, be a very clear and logical
construction....It includes peoples containing many of them blood of very mixed races,
but the governing or controlling element or strain in all is supposed to be that of a
fair-complexioned people of European descent. In 1790 the distinctions of race were
not so well known or carefully drawn as they are to-day. At that date all Europeans
were commonly classed as the white race, and the term "white" person in the statute
then enacted must be construed accordingly.
Ex Parte Shahid, 205 F. 813, 815 (D.C.S.C. 1913). This court recognized the geographic
interpretation as an effort to avoid the question of race classification by establishing
Europe as the spatial proxy for whiteness. It is not by accident that courts bent on objectivity and immigration restrictions moved away from the ethnographic interpretation deployed by petitioners for naturalization, as once deployed, those categories enabled many to
receive the property of citizenship denied to others under later, more restrictive standards
of interpretation.
104.

Ex Parte Shahid, 205 F. at 814.
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ing of the term "free white persons" as best construed geographiThis view served to sever the ethnological connection becally.'
tween the term "white" and Caucasian, a linkage that fostered the
award of citizenship to applicants from Syria, India, and Turkey.
A geographic rendering of the phrase also effectively suggested
that citizenship rights were meant only for those applicants readily assimilable so as not to force cultural and social emendation of
the national character. As a federal district court in Oregon observed in the face of the governments opposition to the applicant
of a native of Syria:
The essential contention of the government against the admission of the applicant is that the words "free white person".
. . were intended to include only those peoples of the white
race who, at the time of the formation of the government,
lived in Europe and were inured to European governmental
institutions, or upon the American continent, and comprehended such only of the white races who, from tradition,
teaching, and environment, would be predisposed toward our
form of government, and thus readily assimilate with the
people of the United States. 10'
As a geographical proposition, the property of citizenship might
now only be found in the applicant whose ready assimilation
might secure rather than disrupt the meaning and properties of
nationhood.
For instance, in the naturalization case of Bhicaji Franyi Balsara, a native of India, the federal district court of New York justified limiting citizenship to "free white persons," contending that in
framing the original act, Congress "intended it to include only
white persons belonging to those races whose emigrants had contributed to the building up on this continent of the community of
people which declared itself a new nation."' 7 The court further
observed that, while not a scientific means for determining the
attribution of citizenship, in the absence of an authoritative interpretation of the racial restrictions, it nevertheless served Congressional intent more closely than the judicial equation of "white per105. As one court observed, "Under such interpretation it would mean by the term 'free
white persons' all persons belonging to the European races, then commonly counted as
white and their descendants." Id. at 813.
106. In re Ellis, 179 F. at 1003.
107. In re Balsara, 171 F. 294, 295 (S.D. N.Y.1909).
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sons" with the Aryan race." 8 Such an equation would, Judge Lacombe fretted, allow an award of citizenship not only to Aryans
such as Balsara, but would also allow in "Afghans, Hindoos, Arabs, and Berbers," which presented the unlikely result that "Congress intended to make citizenship here free for all of them."'1 9
Nevertheless, regarding Balsara as "a gentleman of high character
and exceptional intelligence," Judge Lacombe granted the citizenship petition."'
Judge Lacombe's enunciation of a labor theory of citizenship,
whereby those who "built the nation" at its inception represented
the petitioners to whom Congress intended to award citizenship,
exemplified the judicial search for twin origins, both of racial identity and of national character."' Balsara'sreasoning resulted in
divorcing dessert from deed by linking the privilege of citizenship
to those who shared only the same race as those who presumably
labored to "build" the nation. Moreover, it yielded a synchronic
view of nation building, one in which only members of those races
present in 1790 might acquire citizenship as "free white persons,"
occurred, nor any addisuggesting that no further nation-building
1 2
tional revisions of the 1790 Act.
Regardless of the thin reed of justification upon which geographical reasoning rested, by the first decade of the twentieth
century, the government had largely abandoned its argument that
whiteness could be distinguished in terms of nativity or color, relying instead upon the equivalency of "white" with "European.""3 As
the district court in Missouri observed, denying U.S. military veteran Easurk Emsen Charr's petition for naturalization on the
grounds that as a Korean national he was not a "free white person":
[T]he words do not mean a person white in color, nor do they
designate racial distinction, meaning Caucasian or IndoEuropean, but are to be construed rather as a geographical
term referring to the peoples who are commonly now in the
United States as those inhabiting Europe, and whose descen-

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Interestingly, this was the effect on immigration with the passage of the JohnsonReed act by Congress in 1924.
113. The court's reasoning in Balsarawas merely a proxy for this equivalency.
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the
dants, at the time of the passage of the act of 1790, formed
114
inhabitants of the United States, excluding Africans.
The government, initially, sought to equate the term "white"
with nation, contending that the phrase meant to include only
those immigrants then known in 1790 to have arrived from England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Germany, Sweden, France, and
Holland."5 However, as one of the consequences of this nationalist
argument, the courts had to exclude Russians, Poles, Italians,
Greeks, and others who had not immigrated by 1790, but who
were considered "white." To cover this difficulty, the government
merely expanded Congress' intent to include all Europeans.
Some courts regarded the government's calculus of racial geography as misguided at best. In reviewing the naturalization petition for Syrian national Tom Ellis, Judge Wolverton considered
the rationale compelling the early Congress to favor certain immigrants over others as reasonable, yet at odds with the guiding
statutory language adopted by Congress."7 The skeptical jurist
rejected the government's efforts to extract geographic significance
from the language of the Naturalization Act, noting,
If it was designed that the statute was to embrace such of the
European races only as in some way by their immigration, alliance, or aid contributed to the settlement of this country and
the establishment and upbuilding of the United States as a
nation among the peoples of the world, it might have been far
better expressed than to have used the simple term 'white' as
designating the races of men entitled to naturalization."'

114. Petition of Easurk Emsen Charr,273 F. 207, 209 (W.D. Mo. 1921). In writing for the
court, Judge Van Valkenburgh does not address the incongruity of the inclusion of the
qualifying term "free" white persons if only Europeans are considered white, "excluding
Africans."
115. Id.
116. See United States v. Balsara, 180 F. at 695 (2d. Cir. 1910). Where the court considers and rejects as untenable the government's argument for locating "white" in geographic
parlance.
117. In re Ellis, 179 F. at 1004.
118. Id. Judge Wolverton further concluded that where the language created ambiguity
and doubt, as it did in the Naturalization Act, the better resolution would be for a broad
interpretation of the term as an interpretation of law, calling on Congress to amend the law
"if the word 'white' in its popular sense is of too broad a signification.' Id. at 1005.
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However, other courts, notably the district court of South Carolina, garnered discernable relief from the geographic rationale.
Referring to the immigrant petitioners, the court noted,
The judge need neither examine his complexion with a microscope nor measure his skull or his limbs or features, nor inquire into his paternity and maternity for past several generations. The test becomes mainly one of geography.1 19
Anticipating this sentiment in an earlier case, the federal district court of South Carolina declined to approve the citizenship
petition of Faras Shahid, observing that his homeland of Syria did
not fall within the boundaries of Europe.1 2 ° Writing for the court,
Judge Smith justified construing the statute to accommodate a
standard of geographic origin as a reasonable effort to infuse objectivity and, hence, ethical legitimacy into judicial determinations
on issues of naturalization.
Echoing the sentiment of other circuits, the court acknowledged the benefit of conditioning citizenship on a defined geographic locus, which enabled the judiciary to
avoid the inherent subjectivity and uncertainty attendant upon
the judicial examination of each petitioner:
One Syrian may be of pure or almost pure Jewish, Turkish, or
Greek blood, and another the pure blooded descendant of an
Egyptian, an Abyssinian, or a Sudanese. How is the court to
decide? It would be most unfortunate if the matter were to be
left to the conclusions of a judge based on ocular inspection.
The geographical interpretation that 'free white persons'
means persons of European habitancy and descent is at least
capable of uniform application, and gives to the statute a construction that avoids the uncertainties of shades of color and
invidious discriminations as to the race of individuals. 22

119. In re Dow, 213 F. 355, 366 (D.C.S.C. 1914).
120. Ex ParteShahid, 205 F.812 ( E.D.S.C. 1913).
121. Id. at 816.
122. Id. at 816. Judge Smith recognized the panoply of European races as including:
Jews who are of Semitic descent, more or less intermixed with the peoples of European
habitancy . . . with people of Celtic, Scandinavian, Teutonic, Iberian, Latin, Greek, and
Slavic descent. It includes Magyars, Lapps, and Finns, who are of Ugric stock, and the
Basques and Albanians. It includes the mixed Latin, Celtic-Iberian, and Moorish inhabitants of Spain and Portugal, the mixed Greek, Latin, Phoenician, and North African inhabitants of Sicily, and the mixed Slav and Tartar inhabitants of South Russia.
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The judicial search for rules "capable of uniform application" in
questions of identity easily translated into the application of consistent property rules. The governmental justification for excluding non-white petitioners from citizenship on the basis of European origin found favor with courts anxious for the seeming coherence of an objectively construed legal standard. As a geographical
certainty, courts wielded the notion of "Europe" as they might an
object of real property that uniformly marked the boundaries of
identity, race and citizenship.
Justifying naturalization decisions on geographic origin, however, did not auger well for jurists convinced that determinations
of racial identity, predicated on place of origin, yielded a beguiling
certainty. At least one judge recognized the argument as mere
race speculation, dismissing the government's position by observing,
Only where a people has remained without considerable emigration or immigration, substantially unmixed, in the same
country for a very long time, do racial and geographical
boundaries coincide. The inhabitants of no considerable part
of Europe belong to a race thus unmixed.12
Locating the definition of whiteness in European heredity
worked merely to displace the question of race distinctions onto
the spatial canvas of a phantom, homogeneous Europe. Maintaining the notion of a racially pure and antiseptic Europe enabled the
geographic location of whiteness to affirm an object centered notion of property by, literally, grounding whiteness, and hence citizenship, in the abstract object of a cohesive European race.
VII. THE SOCIAL CONTINGENCY OF RACE, NATION, AND PROPERTY
By the second decade of the new century, courts endeavored
with greater consistency, to establish the legal parameters of the
term "free white person" as an expression of historically situated
Exparte Shahid, 205 F. 813 at 814. Yet, the court's very recognition of the polyglot of races
in Europe while associating "white" with European suggests the strength of the judicial
yearning for objectivity with which to infuse and legitimate the property of whiteness and
hence citizenship. For these courts, awarding the property of citizenship upon the basis of
subjective judicial examination of the petitioner could not be squared with the classical
conceptions of property. Moreover, from the vantage of these courts, to respond otherwise
would be to undermine the legitimacy afforded judicial pronouncements predicated on
applying, rather than making, the law.
123. In re Halladjian,174 F. 834, 838 (D.Mass. 1909).
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public opinion. In deploying public opinion as a legally significant
standard of racial identity courts yielded not only to the reconfiguration of property as a set of social relations, but also acknowledged the instability of racial determinations that, relying upon
the discourse of classical property rules, imposed whiteness on the
basis of physical appearance, ethnology, or geography. Instead,
the courts set about fashioning a standard for racial identity in
citizenship cases that proved responsive to the new logic of property, one that relied upon the judiciary's elastic and conjured notions of the local, familiar, and personal.
In adopting a relational standard for determining white identity, courts often located the meaning of "free white person" in the
conventional usage of the phrase as commonly understood by citizens of the New Republic in 1790. Such judicial efforts at historical reconstruction proved difficult. The dearth of the historical
record shed little light on Congress' intent in promulgating that
section of the Naturalization Act, while the significance of the
broad language chosen yielded several reasonable interpretations.
Judge Dickinson, for instance, of the district court of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, ventured to reconstruct the historical
moment en route to his denial of Sadar Bhagwab Singh's citizenship application:
Our people, when the first naturalization act was passed, had
a really definite idea of those to whom the privilege of citizenship was to be extended. The difficulty was, not in getting
into accord upon the thought, but the difficulty was in finding
a word or phrase which would express it. Resort was had, as
the only recourse, to the common speech of the people, which
provided a phrase ready at hand, which expressed the
thought meant to be conveyed. The phrase was "white person." Its meaning was wholly conventional, and the convention evidenced by the meaning which the common man extracted from it. It made no pretense to be a term of science,
and was not chosen with a view to scientific definiteness or
accuracy of expression. It was at all events the nearest approach to definiteness of expression among all the words
which were at the command of the lawmaker. Precision
would not be demanded until the expression came to be applied to a particular applicant, and the phrase would be then
interpreted as Congress intended it to be. It will thus be seen
that the difficulties which confronted the lawmakers were not
removed, nor were they surmounted otherwise than by the
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expedient of transferring them to the interpreter. Our difficulties are indeed increased.""
Judge Dickinson's move to embrace a cultural understanding of
an imagined community lent a populist gravitas to his efforts to
stabilize the notion of whiteness. Gradually, the babel of scientific
inquiry yielded to the voice of the community, a voice that might
engender a conventional, cohesive and unitary representation of
racial identity, if only because the bench created the very community upon which it then relied for circumscribing the boundaries of
identity. The ascendency of the community standard as the rhetorical underpinning for determining whiteness also signaled that
legal issues of race and nation, of citizen and self, and of property
and personality were posed in a quest for relational solutions
rather than innate truths. As relational notions of property
gained a foothold in legal discourse, judicial analysis relied less on
categories of color, appearance, and geography to explain and justify determinations of racial identity that conditioned the fruits of
citizenship.
Those competing judicial standards, along with the enduring
presence of ethnographic science as the extra-legal means for
categorizing race, prompted the United States Supreme Court to
address, for the first time, the meaning of the phrase "free white
persons." Two cases, heard in 1922 and reported only three
months apart, provided the judicial vehicle for enunciating the
property nexus of race, nation, and citizenship. Writing for the
Court in Takao Ozawa v. United States2 ' and United States v.
Bhagat Singh Thind,121 Justice Sutherland sought to replace the
multiple judicial voices addressing racial identity with a clarion
note, in a gesture that would garner the legal legitimacy necessary
to convey the valuable property right of citizenship only to petiInstead, Sutherland's efforts
tioners adjudicated as white. 1 7
served to fragment any presumed consensus on racial recognition
by aligning the property of race with historically rendered popular
opinion.'12 Much as the courts experienced in the racial misrecognition cases brought in the southern United States during this
period, expressing identity in terms of a legally constructed com124. In re SadarBhagwab Singh, 246 F. 496, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1917).
125. Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (November 13, 1922).
126. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (Februaryl9, 1923).
127. Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. at 191-92.
128. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. at 211.
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munity standard generated and furthered the judicial expression
of the self as an amalgamated property contingent upon social recognition. 2 9 Not only did this gesture align with and borrow from
the ongoing reconceptualization of property, but it also rendered
the public posture of the self, the aspirational quality of citizenship, thoroughly conditioned by community mores. Rather than
expressing citizenship as a coherent object that helped to secure
the boundaries of the moral personality separate from the community, 130 the public self was now refracted through a prism of
social relationships that were at once historically rendered and
judicially constructed.
In considering the naturalization claims of Takao Ozawa, the
Court first denigrated reliance on physical classification. Such
identification, Justice Sutherland maintained, amounted to legal
undecidability; he warned that "to adopt the color test alone would
result in a confused overlapping of races and a gradual merging of
one into the other, without any practical line of separation. " 131 In
denying Ozawa's application for citizenship, the Court turned to
the language of the Act of 1790, finding that "[t]he intention was
to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of persons
whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it to all who could
not be so classified."'3 2 Underscoring the Court's search for an his129. See Douglas, supra note 61at 911-932.
130. See supra note 24 and accompanying discussion of the independent self in republican ideology.
131. Ozawa 260 U.S. at 197. Interestingly, while racial amalgamation of immigrant
citizens represented the lynch-pin of the "melting-pot" ideology trumpeted during this period, it worked against the legal line drawing relied upon by the courts to distinguish the
races prior to the award of citizenship. However, those very racial demarcations, sought so
strenuously by many courts, actually served to buttress the "melting-pot" ideology. Refusing citizenship to non-white petitioners during the naturalization process enabled assimilationist ideology to flourish as a viable description of American national identity.
132. Ozawa 260 U.S. at 195. The Court prefaced that remark by noting that
the test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each individual is impracticable as
that differs greatly among persons of the same race, even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or yellow races.
Id. In short, the identification of race through physical attributes such as color was too
indeterminate for a court that instead adopted the "common parlance" and cultural commonplace as the legal litmus test for racial identity. Because both yardsticks lent themselves to the vague and inchoate enunciation of race, it seems better to look elsewhere to
understand the Court's choice of tests. By pinning racial definition on conventional meaning and popular opinion, the court crafted a legal measure for citizenship which was consonant with the new discourse of property as a set of social relations rather than as an objective physical attribute; racial identity and proprietary attributes emanated from the group
and from history as a culturally distinguishable set of terms. Additionally, through the
enunciation of a test for racial identity that relied upon "common parlance," the Court
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torically situated interpretation of "common parlance," Justice
Sutherland severed the judicial conversation that had joined the
terms "white person" and Caucasian as synonyms, noting that "it
[was] not important in construing [Congress'] words to consider
the extent of their ethnological knowledge."13 3 The vilification of
scientific experts and ethnological pronouncements marked the
judicial retreat from a narrative that privileged an objective racial
identity, as the Court drew from the new discourse on property to
the personal atcraft a subjective legal standard for determining
13 4
tributes which conditioned citizenship.
In denying Bhagat Singh Thind's application for citizenship, the
Court further pressed its contentions against the propriety of scientific classifications, impugning the "speculative processes of
ethnological reasoning" as "an undertaking of such uncertainty
that common agreement is practically impossible."13 5 Thus, the
term Caucasian, while equivalent to the phrase "white," should
not wield a scientific meaning, the Court urged, but rather should
be taken only as it is "popularly understood," because "under scientific manipulation [Caucasian] has come to include far more
than the unscientific mind suspects."'3 6 After all, the Court emphasized, the 1790 statute was "written in the words of common
speech, for common understanding, by unscientific men. " "'

arrogated to itself the task both of authenticating community meaning and legitimating
judicial decisions upon the basis of community sentiment. This allowed the Court to retain
the power of naming (which was lost when it relied upon ethnology), while also retaining
fidelity to the predominant ideology that find, rather than make, the law. Justice Sutherland echoed that prevailing sentiment when he assured his readers, in closing the Ozawa
opinion, that "[wle have no function in the matter other than to ascertain the will of congress and declare it. Of course there is not implied - either in the legislation or in our
interpretation of it - any suggestion of individual unworthiness or racial inferiority. These
considerations are in no manner involved." Id. at 198.
133. Id. at 198.
134. In Ozawa, Justice Sutherland noted that the words "white persons" "import a
racial, and not an individual test." Id. at 197. Consequently, "white persons" meant "white
race," thus enabling the community to infallibly identify those who possessed whiteness as
a racial marker.
135. Thind 261 U.S. at 213. The court moved back and forth between the common understanding of those writing the statute and, in attacking ethnology, the common understanding of contemporary white America. For instance, in discussing the difficulty inherent in the word Caucasian, the Court noted that the term "under scientific manipulation,
has come to include far more than the unscientific mind suspects," including the Hindu,
Polynesians, the Hamites of Africa. The Court noted, "We venture to think that the average well-informed white American would learn with some degree of astonishment that the
race to which he belongs is made up of such heterogeneous elements." Id at 211.
136. Thind, 261 U.S. at 211.
137. Id. at 211.
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Consequently, discerning the requisite racial boundaries for
citizenship devolved from an exercise in authenticating whiteness
itself to an effort in locating popular opinion toward whiteness.
The court had moved from trying to establish the physical attributes of an object of property to endorsing the determination of
property through reputation. Thus, in the name of certainty and
predictability, the court policed the boundaries of property by authorizing the language and logic of a new property regime that
would dissolve the very boundaries the court sought to enforce.
As the boundary lines demarcating the objectivity of property
dissolved in the face of the reinscription of property as the product
of a set of social relationships, the process of proving ownership
began to resemble a reputational architecture in which the cultural attributes of whiteness were deployed as metaphors for identity. Indeed, for much of Ozawa's brief before the Supreme Court,
his counsel treated the legal composition of whiteness and citizenship as an amalgamation of cultural moments that, taken together, might comprise the critical weight necessary for recognizing the petitioner's racial origins as legally inseparable from the
character of whiteness.'
After the imposition of arguments for the petitioner's whiteness
on the basis of color, geography, and ethnography had faded away,
discounted in the Court's pursuit of the popular meaning of "white
person," the ownership of whiteness emerged as a set of cultural
attributes.
Thus, for instance, Ozawa's Brief before the Court
affirmatively relied upon the observations of Dr. J. Macmillan
Brown that Ozawa was not Asian, but rather Aryan, because the
Japanese "are daring lovers of the seas" and "the dominant races
of man are maritime." 139
The brief further intoned on the intellectual attributes of the
Japanese, noting "the mental alertness of the Japanese, a quality
of mind in which they differ from other Asiatics and resemble the
Europeans and the inhabitants of North America above the Mexican line." 4 ° To punctuate the cultural moment, Ozawa's counsel
reminded the Court that "the Japanese are commonly called "The
Yankees of the Orient," and they show no marks of the degeneracy

138. Brief for the Plaintiff in Error at 40-59, Ozawa (No. 1).
139. Id. at 58. Brown was Vice Chancellor of the University of New Zealand. Ozawa's
counsel quoted from a paper Brown delivered before the Hawaiian Historical Society, September 5, 1918, discussing the phonology of the Polynesian dialects.
140. Id.
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To further

enunciate the requisite properties of a "white person," Ozawa's
counsel enlisted the observations of the traveler George Kennan:
At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Japanese
were the most daring and adventurous navigators in all the
Far East .... All the Japanese of that time were imbued with
an ardent spirit of daring and adventure, and long before the
Mayflower sailed from Plymouth they had settlements, or
colonies, in countries that are farther away from Japan than
Massachusetts is from England. They took possession of the
Luchu Islands, overran Formosa, helped the Spanish Governor of the Philippines to put down a revolt of the Chinese in
Luzon, gained a strong foothold in Siam, and, fighting there
in defense of the King, defeated invading forces of both Spaniards and Portuguese.'42
As a constellation of social relationships, the property of whiteness might now be expressed through the cultural rhetoric of aggression and domination, entrepreneurship and exploration, and
intelligence and ingenuity. Through his brief, Ozawa aligned his
Japanese racial heritage with Aryan origins, invoking a cultural
posture premised on those markers as attributes of white civilization. The content of that cultural posture gained in importance as
the courts began to rely on popular sentiment to shape the
boundaries of white racial identity and the consequent property of
citizenship.
Even Judge Dickinson, who penned the federal district court's
denial of Sadar Bhagwab Singh's citizenship petition, predicated
on the "wholly conventional" meaning of "white person," regarded
the judiciary's rhetorical arsenal on the subject of whiteness "more
like a decision arbitrarily announced than a reasoned conclusion."'
In his opinion, Judge Dickinson lamented the seeming
indeterminacy of meaning in the contemporary term "white person," upon which he had to rest his decision:
Classification is a necessity of speech because it is a necessity
of thought. Very broad and very general classifications are
141. Id. Here, for support, Ozawa's counsel draws upon the phrasing of a Doctor Baelz of
the Imperial University of Tokyo as quoted by Kawakami in "Japan in World Politics," p.
112.
142. Id. at 64, 65.
143. In re Sadar Bhagwab Singh, 246 F. at 500.
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relatively easy. It is very difficult to make them definite. In
the end the limitations under which we labor drive us to a
real or assumed convention. We more or less arbitrarily label
the subject and classify according to the presence or absence
of the label. Our language, as is every other, is full of illustrations of conventions thus reached or imposed. Our language
is a living thing. Because it is alive, it is every changing.
Words in the process of taking on accretions of meaning and
of elimination become in effect different words, and indeed not
infrequently come to have a meaning the exact opposite of
that which was conveyed by their first use. Even among a
people who speak the same language, the same word acquires
one meaning in one locality and a different meaning in another."'
Acknowledging the plasticity and relational quality of the meaning of "white person," Judge Dickinson equated the expansion of
that classification with the increased presence of immigrants from
diverse locales, observing that due to the influx of immigrations
from Southern and Southeastern Europe, "the phrase employed in
the legislation of 1790 had a broader scope of meaning than it had
in Colonial days, and the same phrase in 1875 commanded a still
broader meaning.""5 Indeed, for Dickinson, the application of
whiteness had an almost limitless reach; he observed,
When the long looked for Martian immigrants reach this part
of the earth, and in due course 'a man from Mars' applies to
be naturalized, he may be recognized as white within the
meaning of the act of Congress,
and admitted to citizenship;
146
Caucasian.
a
be
not
may
but he
In observing the amalgamated condition of the phrase "white
person," as it served to constrain and channel the composition of
citizenship as a property value, the court was at once recognizing
its fundamental importance while abandoning any insistence on
objective certainty.
Indeed, Judge Dickinson sought justification for the relative
elasticity of the phrase "white person" in "historical interpretation," a method that pointedly eschewed the seeming scientific
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 498.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 500.
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objectivity of ethnologists in their search for the biological roots of
racial identity. For Judge Dickinson, the linguistic meaning of
"white person" evolved, Whig-like, from the vague and narrow appreciation understood by the authors of the 1790 Naturalization
Act to a more capacious rendering that recognized "Slavic,"
"Latin," and "Hebrew" immigrants, only reaching the limits of its
elasticity with regard, in this particular instance, to "the race of
people commonly known as Hindus." 4 ' Bestowing the property of
citizenship was a relational matter, as legally legitimate as, and a
consequence of, the appreciation of the meaning of "white person"
to include heretofore excluded voices. The regulating principle in
Judge Dickinson's taxonomy of whiteness was the rather contingent notion that new citizens should be homogenous with those
persons already recognized as citizens.
Thus by 1917 at least one court recognized that the meaning of
whiteness reflected the very composition of citizenship that it was
meant to constrain. As the boundaries of what the courts were
willing to recognize as racial homogeneity shifted, the objectivity
of the phrase "white person" acquiesced to an historical rendering
in which the meaning of whiteness and the consequent property of
citizenship emerged from the field as a time-bound cultural constellation.
Judges gave voice to that cultural constellation
through discussions of homogeneity and assimilation, relational
terms regulated not by geography or biology or science, but by judicial interpolation of a seemingly cohesive community of citizens.
In that sense, relational discourse was the legal posture of apology
for, or recognition of, late-nineteenth century immigration patterns largely from Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, the rhetoric of racial homogeneity that regulated
the meaning and appearance of citizenship rights was conditioned
upon a rapidly receding reality for its judicial legitimacy. Relying
on popular opinion to validate judicial determinations of race
forced the courts to recognize a constellation whose relational
boundaries of recognition fluctuated through the accommodation
of liminal figures; new citizens whose inclusion affected the very
limits and meanings of racial homogeneity. Although the invocation of "common parlance" as a legal standard implied that one
common voice determined the limits of homogeneity, the source of
that rhetoric in the community undermined judicial appeals to
identity, homogeneity, and objectivity. The ascendancy of the re147. Id. at 499, 500.
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lational conceptions of property, citizenship, and self precluded
the efficacy of the very governing principle to which the judiciary
now turned to confirm racial identity - the seemingly univocal
voice of "common understanding."
VIII. COMPETING JUDICIAL VOICES

The invocation of the phrase "common parlance," first invoked
as one means for discerning whiteness in the 1873 California decision of In re Ah Yup, had by 1922 become the litmus test used by
the Court in Ozawa and Thind to clarify the process for establishing white racial identity in naturalization cases. Yet, in the intervening years, a few notable lower court opinions adopted the
"common parlance" standard to infuse meaning into the term "free
white persons," and consequently resist retrieving a fixed historical view of a homogenous nation. These courts refused to deploy a
legal narrative that sought to locate the fixed and certain boundaries of property and racial identity in a judicially imagined public
opinion. Treating "common parlance" as a coherent legal standard
was viewed by these courts as an effort to place the new wine of
relational property into the old bottle of objective property.
Rather than apply that classical model of property to the new appreciation of legal ownership as a bundle of rights, these courts
approached the legal standard of "common parlance" as a question
whose answer proved temporal and contingent.
For instance, writing for the Fourth circuit in the case of native
Syrian George Dow, Judge Woods determined that the meaning of
whiteness changed each time the legislature re-enacted the racial
strictures on naturalization.14 8 As Woods suggested, the standard
of "common parlance" embodied not the originary intent of enactment but the iterative acts reproducing the law. Thus, because
the statute of 1790 had been "amended, repealed or re-enacted"
more than twenty times during the course of the nineteenth and
into the twentieth century, the "growth of popular and legislative
conception of the meaning of 'free white persons' from 1790 to
1875, the date of the last enactment on the subject, is the controlling factor in ascertaining the meaning legislators intended should
be given to the words as they stand in the present law."'49 Observing that "a repealed statute has no force," the court afforded no
148.
149.

Dow v. United States, 226 Fed. 145 (4th Cir. 1915).
Dow, 226 Fed. at 147.
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legal or cultural weight to the common understanding of "free
white persons" surrounding the 1790 inception of the Naturalization Act.'5 ° To decide otherwise, Judge Woods observed, would be
to fail to respect the definite opinions and conceptions of the legislators ratifying the subsequent statutes that superceded the iniWhiteness was to be imagined as legislators might
tial act."'
have perceived it at the time of the latest re-enactment of the Act
of 1790, which, in the case of Dow, was 1903.192
Similarly, in the case of In re Halladjian,Justice Lowell of the
federal court in Massachusetts granted the citizenship applications of four Armenian petitioners, by relying on the popular usage of the term "free white persons."'5 3 In reaching his determination, Lowell relied on late-eighteenth century census documents,
from the individual colonies and the new Republic, which classified inhabitants as "whites, negroes and mulattos, Indians and
'French neutrals.""5 4 In his analysis, Judge Lowell regarded the
150. Id. However, Judge Woods maintained that even if the Act of 1790 were to be
solely relied upon and rendered narrowly, there is little evidence that it was meant to be
restricted only to Europeans and Caucasians. He reasoned,
In 1790, when the first act was passed, immigration to this country was almost altogether from Europe; and doubtless the act of 1790 was intended mainly to provide for
naturalization of aliens from Europe, and to deny naturalization to Negroes. With
other peoples this country had little intercourse and little concern. Accordingly the
records of Congress indicate that the debates on the bill of 1790 related to European
immigration.... The science of ethnology had made little advance in 1790, and the
notion of racial division and the meaning of the term "white" in a comprehensive
sense as applied to men were probably quite vague and indefinite in the minds of legislators. Yet in not mentioning the people of Europe, and in extending the privilege
of naturalization to any "free white person," it seems reasonable to think that the
Congress must have believed that there were white persons natives of countries outside of Europe. The writers on the subject of that day, to say the least, were not
agreed in the view that Europeans were the only white people.
Id. at 147.
151. The legislature legally "touched" the Act of 1790 in 1795, 1798, 1802, 1813, 1814,
1816, 1824, 1828, 1848, 1862, 1867, 1868, 1873, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1882, 1894, 1898, and
1903.
152. We find a similar argument in In re Mohan Singh, 257 Fed. at 210, where the legal
import of authorial intent is recognized in those repeating the statute through reenactment rather than in the congressional progenitors of the Act: "With the march of time
and growth of knowledge, ethnologically and otherwise, however, it may be inferred, I
think, that Congress, in its successive re-enactments of the language, has re-enacted it with
its enlarged meaning in mind."
153. In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 ( D. Mass. 1909).
154. Id. at 842. Judge Lowell specifically relied upon the Massachusetts census of 1764.
He also looked to the Rhode Island census of 1748, which classified inhabitants as "whites,
negroes and indians," as did the census of 1774. This classification was also repeated in the
Connecticut census of 1756, while the same state census of 1774 merely differentiated
between blacks and whites. The New York census of 1698 classified between men, women,
children, and negroes, that of 1723 as between whites, negroes, and other slaves, while
those of 1731, 1737, 1746, 1749, 1756 and 1771 as between white and black, and that of
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term "white" not as a repository of physical attributes, but as an
extensively relational term, signifying the absence of the other
categorized inhabitants. 51 5 In other words, whiteness was defined
by what it was not. Thus, Lowell contended that the term "White"
"includeld] all persons not otherwise specified" in the early census
reports, noting that the census of 1790 "shows that everybody but
a negro or an indian was classed as a white person."'56
Justice Lowell was not alone in his observation.'5 7 In awarding
Mohan Singh's petition for citizenship, Judge Bledsoe of the federal district court in California, reviewed South Carolina's 1786
naturalization statute, which provided for the naturalization of
"all free white persons" and provided the language for Congress'
1790 draft.18 Assigning legal weight to each and every word in the
1786 as between whites, slaves and "Indians who pay taxes." New Jersey and Maryland
census data also followed this trend. As Lowell noted, of the census act of 1790, providing a
census of all inhabitants except untaxed Native Americans:
These inhabitants were to be classified by "color" and the schedule provided by the
statute made a classification as free whites, other free persons, and slaves. It is evident from the governments publication just quoted that the phrase "other free persons" was construed to mean "free negroes" and this was substantially the classification made in the census taken in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Id. at 842.
155. For similar analysis applied to the categories of heterosexuality and homosexuality,
see Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1992).
156. In reHalladjian at 842-43. Judge Lowell was not a judicial relativist, but rather
found the term "white person" too uncertain a term for courts to invoke it as a reliable
standard for naturalization claims. In an opinion drawn the following year, Justice Lowell
returned to the question of race classification for citizenship by expressing frustration with
the only tenable interpretation
to give the phrase "white person" the meaning which it bore when the first naturalization act was passed, viz., any person not otherwise designated or classified, is to
make naturalization depend upon the varying and conflicting classification of persons
in the usage of successive generations and of different parts of a large country.
As such, Judge Lowell simply found the limiting criteria "white person" incapable of effectively determining the naturalization rights of individuals.
157. See also United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1910). In Balsara, the Second
Circuit determined that Bhicaji Franyi Belsara, a Parsee immigrant, would be admitted to
citizenship on the basis of race. The court concluded that in using the term "free white
person" the Congress of 1790 "probably had principally in mind the exclusion of African,
whether slave or free, and Indians, both of which races were and had been objects of serious
public consideration." Id. at 695. While recognizing that "the Chinese, Japanese, and Malays and the American Indians do not belong to the white race," the court found little difficulty in acknowledging the Parsee as a "white person." The Parsees, the court observed
"emigrated some 1,200 years ago from Persia into India, and now live in the neighborhood
of Bombay, to the number of about 100,000. They constitute a settlement by themselves of
intelligent and well-to-do persons, principally engaged in commerce, and are as distinct
from the Hindus as are the English who dwell in India." Id.
158. In re Mohan Singh, 257 F.209 (S.D. Ca. 1919). Judge Bledsoe noted that the original bill containing the phrase "free white persons" was reported to Congress by a committee
of three representatives from Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. Each of these
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phrase the court crafted a conclusion driven by historical perspective:
It seems therefore obvious that the South Carolina Legislature was declining to accept into the citizenry of the colony
slaves and indented servants of every character and color
along with those who, in comparison with "reds" and "blacks,"
then present in large numbers, were to be considered as
"whites." There is nothing that I can discover to indicate
anywhere that either the colonies originally or the United
States government later, when the federal statute was first
passed, had in mind the exclusion from citizenship of any
other persons than those referred to, to wit, negroes, Indians,
and unfree whites. 9
Federal district Judge Maxey, similarly, subjected the naturalization statute to scrutiny in granting citizenship to Ricardo Rodriguez, a native of Mexico. 6 ° The court voiced its concern that Congress would not have needed to enact laws against naturalizing
Chinese nationals in 1872 and 1882, if the Chinese immigrants
were already denied the right to become naturalized citizens pursuant to the interpretation of the 1790 naturalization statute
found in the leading case of In re Ah Yup."6 ' Judge Maxey observed, "[lt is a debatable question whether the term 'free white
person' as used in the original act of 1790, was not employed for
the sole purpose of withholding the right of citizenship from the
black or African race and the Indians then inhabiting this country."162 It appeared clear to Judge Maxey that, in passing the Chinese restriction laws Congress recognized what the court in Ah
Yup had not, namely, that the 1790 naturalization act served
merely to sequester citizenship from the claims of bonded Africans
or indigenous Americans and, thus, required an express effort
from Congress to immunize the country from the perceived threat
of invasion from across the Pacific. 61 Judge Maxey resolved the
states had naturalization statutes, the latest of which was the 1786 enactment by South
Carolina adopting language virtually identical to the Congressional act. Id at 211.
159. Id. at 211.
160. In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337 (D.C. Tex. 1897).
161. Id. at 349.
162. Id. In his Rodriguez opinion, Judge Maxey limited Ah Yup, then the leading case
on the interpretation of the statute, solely to the Chinese national petitioning for naturalization.
163. Id.
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interpretive difficulty by sidestepping its legal application, granting the right of citizenship to Ricardo Rodriguez based on a reading of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, concluded between the
United States and Mexico, on February 2, 1848." In so doing, the
Judge relied upon the "collective acts of naturalization" that ocwhen territory was ceded to the United
curred among inhabitants
165
treaty.
through
States
M

IX. CONCLUSION

In the five decades preceding the Supreme Court's decisions in
Ozawa and Thind, the federal and state judiciary entertained a
panoply of legal justifications for discerning whiteness among immigrants petitioning for American citizenship. In the range of
legal reasons, from physical identification based on appearance to
the ethnography of family lineage, and from geographic origin to
community sentiment, the courts sought to hone the metrics of
racial identification consonant with shifting property conceptions.
Lending legal voice to the twin urges of white hegemony and racial exclusion at play in these naturalization cases served to further amplify the broader, prevailing nativist sentiments exalting
the purity of a national family delineated by race. These judicial
calibrations of whiteness not only served to formalize the appearance of a new national citizenship, but eventually eroded the
courts' leverage as the source of reasoned deliberation on issues of
immigrant racial identity.
One of the central threads animating these naturalization cases
was the judicial yearning for certainty. In reviewing petitioners'
claims for citizenship, the tenor of the emerging judicial discourse
that wed together race, nation, and property, hewed closely to the
judicial conceit that courts merely identified value but did not establish legal meaning. Courts, consequently, sought the necessary
164. Id. at 353
165. In Rodriguez, the court recognized the frequency of collective naturalization, pointing to its occurrence, regardless of color, in Florida, Texas, California, Arizona and Louisiana. In re Rodriguez at 339. See also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 19 How. 393,
533 ( McLean, diss.), mentioning similar disparities between monitoring the color-line and
the collective award of citizenship:
On the question of citizenship it must be admitted that we have not been very fastidious. Under the late treaty with Mexico, we have made citizens of all grades, combinations, and colors. The same was done in the admission of Louisiana and Florida.
No one ever doubted, and no court ever held, that the people of these territories did
not become citizens under the treaty. They have exercised all the rights of citizens,
without being naturalized under the acts of congress.
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legal clarity along an avenue that would complement the requirements of judicial formalism, namely, through the treatment of racial identity as a property of the individual body and of the national body.
However, the thread of objectively construed property was severed by the Supreme Court in Ozawa and Thind. Courts were
directed to predicate racial identity, whiteness, and national citizenship upon the "common understanding" of the community, a
move that mimicked the relational changes in property conceptions while also providing an arrangement that enabled the courts
to presume public opinion through an adopted ventriloquism.
Just as contemporary writers had witnessed the fragmentation of
property between ownership and control, so also had they witnessed the property of racial identity, divided between individual
possession and social and institutional control of racial personality, its meaning and value. Courts now ascertained the racial
identity of petitioners for citizenship from the community to which
petitioners sought entrance. By endorsing the importance of local
and familiar speech to signify whiteness, courts collaborated in
dismantling the former, essentializing discourse of objectivity,
while simultaneously authorizing a new language and logic of
property that nurtured the multiple voices of legal modernity.
Yet, the judicial reliance on the relational regime of property to
exclude non-white petitioners from citizenship did not prove prophylactic enough in the burgeoning nativist culture of the 1920s.
Beginning in 1921 with the Immigration Act and extending its
reach in the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, Congress established and
extended the technology of national quotas premised on the already existing ancestral composition of the American population,
thus removing from the courts the determination of racial identity
predicated on a relational doctrine of property. While "common
understanding" or community sentiment remained the deliberative test of whiteness in the American South, after 1924 an immigrant petitioner might only be considered for citizenship if his or
her nationality was already represented in the restrictive 1890
census. To receive citizenship now required proof of title by the
petitioner. Thus, by the mid-1920s, the award of citizenship reverted to a proprietary form predicated on "family" writ large as
courts required proof of title in the form of previous racial lineage.
Consequently, naturalization shifted from a status that might be
acquired through the imprimatur of a willing community, to one
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that required proof of inheritance from an already naturalized
citizen:s

